IRAN BALLISTIC

Iran could use its ICBMs to Launch an EMP Attack in Space, Crippling U.S. Infrastructure

2010-04-20T23:09:00.000-07:00

Also, Iran could punch America's soft ribs by launching an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack in space. In 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission warned that the United States could face a "space Pearl Harbor." The consequences of a space Pearl Harbor would be particularly harmful to the United States given our dependence on space. As space defense analyst Robert Butterworth notes: "Far more than any other country, the U.S. depends on space for national and tactical intelligence, military operations, and civil and commercial benefits. A 'scorched space' attack…would hurt the U.S. most of all." This option is particularly salient in light of Iranian reluctance to suspend its nuclear program. Iran could elect to detonate a nuclear weapon (or multiple weapons) in space, causing an EMP. In this worst-case-scenario the mere ability to wreak havoc on U.S. satellites in orbit affords the Iranians significant leverage. The Claremont Institute's Brian Kennedy reminds us, "Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP."

National Security Concerns are Driving Iran's Space Effort

2010-04-20T23:07:00.000-07:00

The third factor is Iranian national security. The attributes of space power may be tempting for a country that seeks both to increase its security, whilst at the same time assert its dominance in the region. The ability of imaging satellites, for example, to provide strategic intelligence and early warning against a surprise attack by any number of Iran's neighbouring states would be of enormous benefit. Of course, that same capability can provide Iran with the ability to accurately target its ballistic missile capabilities, thereby increasing the deterrent value of Iran's WMD-armed missiles (this assumes that Iran's goal is indeed to develop nuclear weapons). For Iran, such a capability would help lessen the disparities in space and missile power that exists today between it and Israel. Indeed, it could be argued that Iran's nuclear actiivies are already spurring a number of its neighbours to look at procuring their own imaging satellites in order to help hedge against a surprise Iranian nuclear breakout. Turkey has expressed an interest in such a capability, as have the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt and Pakistan. Saudia Arabia has an advanced space programme and is one of the countries in the region that might feel most threatened by a nuclear Iran.

Nationalism is Motivating Factor Behind Iran's Space Program

2010-04-20T23:06:00.002-07:00

A number of factors inform the need Iranians perceive for a space programme. The first is the enhancemnet of national pride. Satellites are cutting-edge technologies and like the Iranian nuclear programme, denotes technological and scientific elan, which becomes a source of national pride that can overcome political differences between reformists and conservatives. Much like the Chinese space programme, there is an element of nationalism to the Iranian space programme that can help legitimate an unpopular regime.

Iran is working on intercontinental ballistic missiles

2010-04-20T23:06:00.001-07:00

Iran also has a significant ballistic missile development program. Besides its numerous short-range systems, Iran is developing a medium-range ballistic missile (Shahab-3) based on North Korean No Dong technology. In its quest for longer reach, Iran is developing an extended range Shahab-3 (which can travel 1,300 km and threaten Israel) and a new medium-range system (which may travel 2,000 km and reach into portions of Europe). In November 2006, Iran showcased on television several ballistic missile launches, to include the Shahab-3, demonstrating for the world the importance Tehran places on its ballistic missile development program. Iran is believed to be working on intercontinental range ballistic missiles, which may be in its arsenal by 2015, that is if it does not import longer-range systems from proliferators like North Korea earlier than that.

Iran Working on Missiles that could give them MIRV and ASAT Capabilities

2010-04-20T23:05:00.003-07:00

Israeli and U.S. intelligence are also assessing new data that indicate Iran could be developing the ability to launch multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRVed) warheads atop a missile capable of striking Western Europe or Israel. Iranian air force Gen. Hossein Salaami earlier hinted that such a development is underway.

A MIRVed missile could increase the threat to Europe and Israel should the Iranians perfect biological or chemical weapons capability, let alone nuclear warheads.

Iran could use such missile capability to deter the U.S. and European governments from challenging the expansion of Iranian authority in the Middle East. But the Iranian missile development surge also holds other risks.

An assessment by strategic think tank Globalsecurity.org finds that Iranian missile developments could also "provide Iran with a rudimentary anti-satellite capability" threatening critical U.S., Israeli or European spacecraft.

Iran's Ballistic Missile Program is Threatening even Without its WMD Ambitions

2010-04-20T23:05:00.001-07:00

Indeed, Iran's missile programme has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication and size for a proliferant country. Tehran is reported to possess a tactical arsenal comprising several hundred Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles14-equivalent to Scud-B and Scud-C. The quest for longer-range systems reportedly started at the beginning of the 1990s with support from the DPRK. The first flight test of the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 in 1998 started a long series of tests and the official deployment of the missile in 2003.16 With such a missile Tehran gains the ability to threaten Israel as well as part of Europe. Iran has also conducted the development of modern anti-ship cruise missiles, culminating with the announcement from Tehran of the deployment of a Raad anti-ship cruise missile in 2004. Furthermore, Iran allegedly illegally acquired six AS-15 missiles from Ukraine in 2001. The transfer was revealed by Hryhoriy Omelchenko, member of the Ukrainian parliament, in February 2005, and since then has been the subject of a legal investigation in Ukraine. According to this investigation, intermediaries of the operation-including a Russian national employed by the Oboronexport weapons export company- apparently used false end-user certificates to circumvent Ukrainian export control regulations. This missile, with a theoretical range of 2,500km, was apparently part of a batch of Soviet missiles for which the nuclear warheads had been returned to Moscow as part of a bilateral agreement in the middle of the 1990s. It would seem realistic to believe that Tehran has attempted to copy the received missiles since the sale, particularly the propulsion and navigation systems. On the other hand, considering information available about the state of the missiles as received by Iran and the relative inexperience of military units in the use of ground attack missiles, it seems improbable that they were immediately deployed.

Iran is Launching its own Satellite to Test Long-Range Missile Technologies

2010-04-20T23:04:00.001-07:00

Iran has converted one of its most powerful ballistic missiles into a satellite launch vehicle. The 30-ton rocket could also be a wolf in sheep's clothing for testing longer-range missile strike technologies, Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reports in its Jan. 29 issue.

The Iranian space launcher has recently been assembled and "will liftoff soon" with an Iranian satellite, according to Alaoddin Boroujerdi, the chairman of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission.

The move toward an independent space launch capacity is likely to ratchet up concern in the U.S. and Europe about Iran's strategic capabilities and intents. Orbiting its own satellite would send a powerful message throughout the Muslim world about the Shiite regime in Tehran.

Iran continues to improve on its ability to jam satellite transmissions over large area

2010-04-20T23:00:00.000-07:00

Iran continued to jam satellite reception in Tehran in 2005. While satellite dishes are technically banned in Iran, the government has reportedly taken additional steps to prevent reception of international opposition television stations, including Voice of America's Persianlanguage programming. The jammers did not affect the uplink, but instead broadcast microwave signals across Tehran to prevent reception over the local area, a procedure that is not banned by international law. The US Broadcasting Board of Governors responded on 17 June 2005 in support of Voice of America and other affected stations by providing access to a third satellite to broadcast their signals simultaneously with the current two (Telstar 12 and EutelSat's Hotbird), thus making it more difficult for Iranian authorities to jam the signals. This local jamming technique would be applicable to counter-intelligence or battlefield situations as well, providing the ability to temporarily block satellite reception over specific areas without damaging space assets or disrupting services outside of the area.

Iran is a Space Power Threat (1361)

2010-04-20T22:58:00.000-07:00

A nation does not need to be a space-faring nation to have anti-space capabilities. Space assets include the ground segment, the space segment, and most importantly the link segment. A state-actor or a non-state actor (such as demonstrated by Falun Gong's hijacking of a PRC communicatons satellite) can attack a nation's space assets by attacking any or all of these segments. In Iran's case, they possess missiles. They possess warheads. And they may soon possess a nuclear device. Together these can be used in a SCUD-derived launch vehicle or a more sophisticated launch vehicle to attack satellites in low earth orbit. These attacks can be directed at specific satellites or all satellites depending on whether high-explosives or nuclear devices are used - the satellite can be taken down by a direct hit or by the explosion and debris from the explosion; a satellite can be taken down by a nuclear device either through the direct explosion or through total dose and dose-rate radiation effects; debris and radiation effects will affect not only the targeted satellite but satellites in a whole band of orbits - radiation effects could also affect satellites in higher orbits and disrupt space and terrestrial communications through scintilation and distortion of the ionosphere. Iran, any other terrorist-sponsoring nation, or terrorist group could also attack ground-based space assets and disrupt command and control of our space assets; jam communications links, or take command and control of satellites. Iran has demonstrated the ability to jam satellite communications. Iran has the growing capability to and the demonstrated intention of disrupting US utlization of space, hence they are a threat.

Iran to Build New Unmanned, Radar-Evading Bomber

2009-08-30T23:47:00.000-07:00

TEHRAN (FNA)- Iran is due to build a new model of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) by the end of September, a senior Iranian army commander announced on Sunday
"The new drone built on a one-seventh scale will be built before the Sacred Defense Week (anniversary of the beginning of Iran's sacred defense against an 8-year-long war imposed by Iraq from 1980 to 1988) and will be put to new tests," Iranian Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hassan Shahsafi told reporters here in Tehran.

The virtual model of the drone will be presented to the Defense Ministry after different tests in future, Shahsafi added.

He explained that the virtual size of the model UAV which has passed preliminary tests successfully in Tehran last month will be manufactured for reconnaissance missions but can also bomb targets and evade radars.

Also earlier this month, the Iranian Air Force produced a new training fighter jet named 'Kosar' which is a joint production of the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces' Aviation Industries.

Iran successfully tested a home-made radar-evading Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) with bombing capabilities in June. Also last year, the country's Defense Industries launched the production lines of two well-known home-made fighter jets, namely Saeqeh (Thunderbolt) and Azarakhsh (Lightening).

Wary of naked force, Israelis eye cyberwar on Iran

2009-08-26T13:23:00.000-07:00

RAMAT HASHARON, Israel (Reuters) - In the late 1990s, a computer specialist from Israel's Shin Bet internal security service hacked into the mainframe of the Pi Glilot fuel depot north of Tel Aviv.

It was meant to be a routine test of safeguards at the strategic site. But it also tipped off the Israelis to the potential such hi-tech infiltrations offered for real sabotage.

"Once inside the Pi Glilot system, we suddenly realized that, aside from accessing secret data, we could also set off deliberate explosions, just by programing a re-route of the pipelines," said a veteran of the Shin Bet drill.

So began a cyberwarfare project which, a decade on, is seen by independent experts as the likely new vanguard of Israel's efforts to foil the nuclear ambitions of its arch-foe Iran.

The appeal of cyber attacks was boosted, Israeli sources say, by the limited feasibility of conventional air strikes on the distant and fortified Iranian atomic facilities, and by U.S. reluctance to countenance another open war in the Middle East.

"We came to the conclusion that, for our purposes, a key Iranian vulnerability is in its on-line information," said one recently retired Israeli security cabinet member, using a generic term for digital networks. "We have acted accordingly."

Cyberwarfare teams nestle deep within Israel's spy agencies, which have rich experience in traditional sabotage techniques and are cloaked in official secrecy and censorship.

They can draw on the know-how of Israeli commercial firms that are among the world's hi-tech leaders and whose staff are often veterans of elite military intelligence computer units.

"To judge by my interaction with Israeli experts in various international forums, Israel can definitely be assumed to have advanced cyber-attack capabilities," said Scott Borg, director of the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, which advises various Washington agencies on cyber security.

Technolytics Institute, an American consultancy, last year rated Israel the sixth-biggest "cyber warfare threat," after China, Russia, Iran, France and "extremist/terrorist groups."

The United States is in the process of setting up a "Cyber Command" to oversee Pentagon operations, though officials have described its mandate as protective, rather than offensive.

CORRUPT, CRASH

Asked to speculate about how Israel might target Iran, Borg said malware -- a commonly used abbreviation for "malicious software" -- could be inserted to corrupt, commandeer or crash the controls of sensitive sites like uranium enrichment plants.

Such attacks could be immediate, he said. Or they might be latent, with the malware loitering unseen and awaiting an external trigger, or pre-set to strike automatically when the infected facility reaches a more critical level of activity.

As Iran's nuclear assets would probably be isolated from outside computers, hackers would be unable to access them directly, Borg said. Israeli agents would have to conceal the malware in software used by the Iranians or discreetly plant it on portable hardware brought in, unknowingly, by technicians.

"A contaminated USB stick would be enough," Borg said.

Ali Ashtari, an Iranian businessman executed as an Israeli spy last year, was convicted of supplying tainted communications equipment for one of Iran's secret military projects.

Iranian media quoted a security official as saying that Ashtari's actions "led to the defeat of the project with irreversible damage." Israel declined all comment on the case.

"Cyberwar has the advantage of being clandestine and deniable," Borg said, noting Israel's considerations in the face of an Iranian nuclear program that Tehran insists is peaceful.

"But its effectiveness is hard to gauge, because the targeted network can often conceal the extent of damage or even fake the symptoms of damage. Military strikes, by contrast, have an instantly quantifiable physical effect."

Tony Skinner of Jane's Defense Weekly cited Israeli sources as saying that Israel's 2007 bombing of an alleged atomic reactor in Syria was preceded by a cyber attack which neutralized ground radars and anti-aircraft batteries.

"State of War," a 2006 book by New York Times reporter James Risen, recounted a short-lived plan by the CIA and its Israeli counterpart Mossad to fry the power lines of an Iranian nuclear facility using a smuggled electromagnetic-pulse (EMP) device.

A massive, nation-wide EMP attack on Iran could be effected by detonating a nuclear device at atmospheric height. But while Israel is assumed to have the region's only atomic arms, most experts believe they would be used only in a war of last resort. (Editing by Jeffrey Heller and Mark Trevelyan)

Iran Missiles Range

2009-08-26T12:57:00.000-07:00

Shahab-1, Shahab-2, Shahab-3, Shahab-4, Shahab-5, Shahab-6, Sijjil-1, Sijjil-2, etc.

Safir (Rocket)

2009-08-26T12:35:00.000-07:00

The Safir (Meaning Messenger or Ambassador in Arabic and adopted by Persian) is the name of the first Iranian expendable launch vehicle that is able to place a satellite in orbit. The first successful orbital launch using the Safir launch system took place February 2, 2009 when a Safir 2 carrier rocket placed the Omid satellite into an orbit with a 258.0 km (160.3 mi) apogee.

A sub-orbital test flight, named Kavoshgar-1 (Persian: کاوشگر ۱, Explorer-1), was conducted on February 4, 2008, as announced by state-run television. A launch on February 25, 2007, may also have been of the same type. The first flights carried instruments to measure the higher atmosphere. The rocket launched on February 4, 2008 was a liquid-propellant-driven rocket, probably a derivative of the Shahab-3, that reached an altitude of 200-250 km in space, and successfully returned science data according to the Iranian News Agency.

On February 19, 2008, Iran offered new information about the rocket and announced that Kavoshgar-1 used a two staged rocket. The first stage separated after 100 seconds and returned to earth with the help of a parachute. The second stage continued its ascent to the altitude of 200 kilometres. However it was not intended to reach orbital velocity.

Earlier reports by the Iranian News Agency suggested that Kavoshgar-1 used a three staged rocket with the first stage separating after 90 seconds and the rocket reaching an orbit between 200 and 250 kilometres.

The successful development and launch of a sounding-space-rocket was already announced a year earlier, on February 25, 2007. It is unknown if the sounding rocket launched on February 25, 2007, and the rocket launched on February 4, 2008, are of the same type.

Iran announced plans to send two more rockets into space during 2008 and four more satellites until 2010.

Safir-1

On 17 August 2008, Iranian officials reported that a Safir was launched successfully without a payload, in preparation for the launch of Iran's first indigenously launched satellite, Omid. Reza Taghizadeh, head of the Iranian Aerospace Organization, told state television "The Safir (Ambassador) satellite carrier was launched today and for the first time we successfully launched a dummy satellite into orbit". As it was announced by Iran, a dummy satellite was put into a 650 km LEO passing over Iran six times every 24 hours.

Alleged failure

According to an American official, "The vehicle failed shortly after liftoff and in no way reached its intended position." Video of the liftoff of the rocket was shown on Iranian state television. Iranian officials released a statement denouncing the allegations as propaganda and stated the Iran would soon launch the Omid satellite. Iran indeed launched Omid satellite on Feb. 2nd 2009, less than six months later.

Safir-2

On 2 February 2009, a Safir rocket conducted Iran's first orbital launch, with the Omid satellite. The two-staged launch vehicle named SAFIR-2 was 22m long with a diameter of 1.25m, weighing about 26 tonnes. The 27 kg Omid satellite was launched into an orbit with a 250 km perigee and 500 km apogee. The evidence is mounting that Safir-2 was more powerful and advanced than initially thought.

Safir-2 Block-II

Iran has begun the development of the planned Block-II Safir booster intended to double its payload capacity with the intent to make it operational by some time in 2010. The launch vehicle is to acquire its increased payload capacity into low earth orbit through the addition of two Samen, solid motor strap-on boosters added to the Shahab-3C derived first stage and possible a new solid motor third stage added to the existing two stage Safir space booster. The announcement of the development start on this booster was made on April 14, 2009 by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This booster is capable of placing satellite in 700 kilometre (440 mile) orbits or doubling its payload capacity.Iran is known to be combining these liquid propellant and solid motor technologies to the development of a more capable Safir block-II class space booster expected in 2010 with over twice the capability of the present Safir space booster. It will utilising two Ghadr-101/Samen strap-on boosters with the first stage with a Safir second stage and potential third stage with in its bulbous payload shroud giving it a 50-200-250 kilogram payload capacity .The Iranian successful development of the Ghadr-101 single stage missile with the Ghadr-101/Samen, Ghadr-110, 110A /Sejjil/Ashura solid propellant two and three stage missiles also indicated a second trend in Iranian developments that will lead to larger more capacity space boosters and potential ballistic missiles.Iran is known to be working on a new nearly all solid propellant boosters with a payload capacity of 330 kilograms to low earth orbit.

Sijil

2009-08-26T12:33:00.000-07:00

The Sejjil missile (Persian: سجیل, meaning "Baked Clay") family of solid-fueled ballistic missiles are replacements of the Shahab liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. It has been alleged that the Sejjil type of ballistic missile is also known by the names Ashura (Ghadr-110) and Samen.

Sijil-1

The Sajjil also known as "Sejjil" or "Sejil" is a two-stage, solid-propellant, surface-to-surface missile (SSM) produced by Iran with a reported 1930 km (1200 mile) range. A successful test launch took place on November 12, 2008. Its range, if confirmed, would allow it to strike targets as far away as Israel and southwestern Europe, though Iran asserts that it is intended for purely defensive purposes.

Design

Details of the design other than the number of stages and that it uses solid fuel have not been released. However, if Iran has succeeded in building a solid-fuel missile with the claimed range, it represents a significant technological achievement, and could be a step towards either a space launch platform or a true ICBM. As a weapon, it would present a much more formidable challenge to Iran's enemies, as solid-fuel missiles can be launched with much less notice than liquid-fueled missiles, making it more difficult to strike them prior to launch.

Sijil-2

The upgraded version named Sejjil-2, with a 2000-2500 km range was test fired on May 20, 2009. The Sejjil-2 surface-to-surface medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) was first tested eight months prior to the actual test launch, which took place in the central Iranian province of Semnan. Improvements include better navigation system, better targeting system, more payload, longer range, faster lift-off, longer storage time, quicker launch, and lower detection possibility. The two main objectives of the upgraded version of Sejjil were precision and swiftness and high Accelertation.

Shahab-6

2009-08-26T12:31:00.000-07:00

Shahab-6 is an alleged Iranian long-range ballistic missile, first reported to the Western public by Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1997. As of 2007, there were no reports that Shahab-6 and Shahab-5 have been ever tested or constructed.; while Shahab-5 specifications were extrapolated from its North Korean prototype, Taepodong-2, no reliable estimates of Shahab-6 capability exist.

According to Israeli intelligence, both Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 capable of 3,000–5,000 kilometer range; some sources reported up to 10,000 kilometer range which enables the missile to reach the eastern coast of the United States as well as most of the Old World targets. The three-stage rocket is expected to rely on stored propellant liquid fuel for the first two stages, with the last solid fuel stage. Unconfirmed reports say that Iran has been assisted by Russia, and relies on Energomash RD-216 engine technology.

Shahab-4

2009-08-26T12:28:00.000-07:00

Type Strategic ICBM
In service Under Development
Used by Iran
Manufacturer Iran
Warhead unknown
Engine Solid

The Shahab-4 (in Persianشهاب-۴, meaning "Meteor-4") liquid propelled missile is a programme[1] for Iran's first missile to bring satellites into orbit.

The IRIS/Shahab-4 called missile project may have resulted in the current Kavoshgar-1 Iranian space rocket.

Shahab-2

2009-08-26T12:27:00.000-07:00

Type Tactical SRBM
In service 1990–present
Used by Iran
Manufacturer Iran
Weight 6,370-6,500 kg
Length 11.37–12.29 m
Diameter 0.885 m
Warhead One
Operational
range 750 km

The Shahab-2 (Arabic and adopted in Persian: شهاب-۲, meaning "Meteor-2") is the successor to the Iranian Shahab-1 missile. The missile itself is a variant of the Scud-C, built from 1990 with the assistance of North Korea. North Korea also aided Iran in converting a missile maintenance facility into an assembly plant for the Scud-Cs.

The missile has a CEP of 50 m, and capable of striking targets in Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Iraq, and depending on launch area, possibly Israel.

On November 2, 2006, Iran fired unarmed missiles to begin 10 days of military simulations. Iranian state television reported "dozens of missiles were fired including Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 missiles. The missiles had ranges from 300 km to up to 2,000 km...Iranian experts have made some changes to Shahab-3 missiles installing cluster warheads in them with the capacity to carry 1,400 bombs." These launches come after some United States-led military exercises in the Persian Gulf on October 30, 2006, meant to train for blocking the transport of weapons of mass destruction

Shahab-1

2009-08-26T12:23:00.000-07:00

Type Tactical SRBM
In service 1987–present
Used by Iran
Production history
Manufacturer Iran
Warhead One
range 350 km

The Shahab-1 ({{Arabic and adopted into Persian شهاب-۱}}, meaning "Meteor-1") was the foundation of the long-range Iranian missile program. The missile itself is a minor variant of the Scud-B, which Iran initially acquired from Libya and Syria between 1985 and 1986. The Scud-B's 300 km range allowed Iran to strike Baghdad during the Iran–Iraq War. Iran later received Scud-B missiles from North Korea and possibly the Soviet Union. During the war between Iran and Iraq it is estimated that Iran fired 100 to 231 Scud B missiles

Iran began making the Shahab-1 sometime between 1988 and 1994 [2].
Shahab is the name of a class of Iranian missiles, service time of 1988-present, which comes in six variants: Shahab-1, Shahab-2, Shahab-3, Shahab-4, Shahab-5, Shahab-6.

Shahab-3

2009-08-26T12:08:00.000-07:00

Type Strategic MRBM
In service 2003–present
Used by Iran
Manufacturer Iran
Variants A,B,C,D
Diameter 1.2 m (3 ft 11 in)
Warhead One (990 kg/2,200 lb) - five cluster warheads in new models (280 kg/620 lb) each
warhead, each warhead can target different destinations.
Avable Nuclear Warhead: Yes
Engine Liquid & Solid (for models made after 2006)
range 2,100 km (1,300 mi)
Speed 5,500 km/h (3,400 mph), 21 mach in final phase.

The Shahab-3 (Persian: شهاب-۳, meaning "Meteor-3") is a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) developed by Iran and based on the Nodong-1.[1] An early variant could fly 1,300 kilometres (810 mi); they can now reach 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi). It was tested from 1998 to 2003 and added to the military arsenal on July 7, 2003, with an official unveiling by Ayatollah Khamenei on July 20.

The forerunners to this missile include the Shahab-1 and Shahab-2. The then-Iranian Defense Minister Admiral Shamkhani has denied that Iran plans to develop a Shahab-4. Some successors to the Shahab have longer range and are also more maneuverable.

Operating under the Sanam Industrial Group (Department 140), which is part of the Defense Industries Organization of Iran, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), with aid from at least three Russian military enterprises, led the development of the Shahab missile.

Shahab-3B

The Shahab-3B differs from the basic production variant. It has improvements to its guidance system and warhead, a few small changes on the missile body, and a new re-entry vehicle whose terminal guidance system and rocket-nozzle steering method are completely different from the Shahab-3A's spin-stabilized re-entry vehicle.

The new re-entry vehicle uses a triconic aeroshell geometry (or 'baby bottle' design) which improves the overall lift to drag ratio for the re-entry vehicle. This allows greater range maneuverability which can result in better precision. The triconic design also reduces the overall size of the warhead from an estimated 1 metric ton (2,200 lb) to 700 kg (1,500 lb).

The rocket-nozzle control system allows the missile to change its trajectory several times during re-entry and even terminal phase, effectively preventing pre-calculated intercept points of radar systems - which is a method nearly all ABM systems use these days. As a high-speed ballistic missile and pre-mission fueling capability, the Shahab-3 has an extremely short launch/impact time ratio. This means that the INS/gyroscope guidance would also remain relatively accurate until impact (important, given the fact that the gyroscopes tend to become inaccurate the longer the flight lasts). The CEP is estimated to be at 30–50 metres (98–160 ft) or less. However, the accuracy of the missile is largely speculative and cannot be confidently predicted for wartime situations.

These improvements would greatly increase the Shahab-3B's survivability against ABM systems such as Israel's Arrow-2 as well as being used for precision attacks against high value targets such as command, control and communications centres.

Shahab-3C&D

Little is known about Shahab-3C and Shahab-3D. From what can be gathered, the missiles have an improved precision, navigation system, and a longer range. The missiles were indigenously developed, and are being mass produced. Iran has a production capacity of 70 units per year.[9]

Defense Industry

2009-08-09T00:12:00.000-07:00

Iran’s modern defense industrial base was developed during the period of the Shah by an import substitution strategy, in which Iran would learn to produce, assemble, repair and maintain military equipment. The United States and the UK were principal suppliers of aircraft, armor, and small arms. Beginning in the mid-1970’s, Iran signed co-production agreements for licensed manufacture of aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, and computer and electro-optic equipment.

Four state-owned organizations constituted the main elements of the defense industrial base. The Military Industries Organization (MIO) was the main control center, and also produced small arms, rockets, mortars, and artillery. The Iran Aircraft Industries (IAI) focused on fighters, the Iran Helicopter Industries (IHI) on helicopters, and the Iran Electronics Industry (IEI) on defense electronics.

In 1963 Iran placed all military factories under the Military Industries Organization (MIO) of the Ministry of War. Over the next fifteen years, military plants produced small arms ammunition, batteries, tires, copper products, explosives, and mortar rounds and fuses. They also produced rifles and machine guns under West German license. In addition, helicopters, jeeps, trucks, and trailers were assembled from imported kits.

Iran was on its way to manufacturing rocket launchers, rockets, gun barrels, and grenades, when the Revolution halted all military activities. The MIO, plagued by the upheavals of the time, was unable to operate without foreign specialists and technicians. By 1981 it had lost much of its management ability and control over its industrial facilities. By 1990, there were over 240 factories and some 12,000 privately owned smaller concerns producing armaments, employing about 45,000 people.

Although the Rafsanjani government, upon election in 1989, took steps to begin military modernization, it was the Gulf War that made it clear that a major modernization of both the armed forces and the defense industrial base was needed. It became apparent that during the period of time in which Iran was rebuilding her own defense industrial base to produce weaponry needed for the Iran-Iraq war, her neighbors were arming with much more advanced technology systems, mostly purchased from the West. Iran’s air and naval forces were obsolete by comparison. Iran became committed to a strategy of defense self-sufficiency as an urgent national requirement. The objective of total self-sufficiency remains today. The benefits of self-sufficiency also include significant savings in hard currency, which is badly needed to retire Iran’s very large foreign debt in order to help overall economic development.

When Rafsanjani was elected as president in 1989, efforts were initiated to consolidate the defense industries and management structure so as to provide a more workable capability than the two-track (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of IRGC) structure that had developed over the previous ten years. The IRGC ministry was dissolved. At the same time, expansion of the overall defense industrial base was initiated, using the technology transfer from imports as a main facilitator.

Another source of transformation was the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Since that time, many defense industries have been significantly underutilized, with some firms operating at only 10-15 percent of their production capacity. By the late 1990s the Iran defense industrial base comprised about 15-10 percent of the country’s industry.

Defense conversion was one solution that was being tried, as well as the privatization of some of the state-owned companies to facilitate conversion. The Iran Electronics Industries, which is Iran’s largest defense company, had 80 percent of its production capacity focused on commercial electronics products by the late 1990s. Commercial sales of radios, televisions, and cell phones have resulted in the tripling of the IEI sales volume over the three years from 1994 to 1997. Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, another leading defense industry, was still heavily focused on defense work, but is also looking for commercial opportunities. AMC started cooperative licensed production of a Ukrainian Antonov 140 dual-use transport aircraft.

Iran is one of a few nations that is trying to achieve a totally self-sufficient armaments capability. Iran has declared self-sufficiency in several critical areas. Besides small arms and artillery, these include armor, and selected naval systems. In May 1998, an official announced that Iran was self-sufficient in the production of armored equipment, achieved by “acquiring sophisticated technology in related fields.” In late 1997, Iran’s navy chief declared that the country was “full self–proficient” in “sea-warfare technology.” The Iranian Navy is "manufacturing its own equipment and other essential items through the work of domestic experts and the naval research center."

Iran has also worked to become self-sufficient in the production of spare parts for weapon systems. In early 1999, the acting commander of the ground forces announced that Iran is now producing 14,000 various kinds of aircraft parts. The domestic manufacture of spare military parts has saved the equivalent of 30 billion rials in hard currency. Iran is also producing the clear majority of parts needed by its armed forces, an Iranian armed forces official announced in early 1997. The following year, the army’s aviation wing produced 90 percent of its spare parts requirements. In 1999, Iran’s Minister of Defense stated that Iran’s defense industrial base is now capable of producing the “fundamental hardware” needed by Iran.

In 1991 Iran announced the first domestic production of ballistic missiles. Although Iran claims a significant degree of self-sufficiency in missile technology, there nevertheless appears to be heavy involvement of Russian, Chinese and North Korean technology.

Overall, Iran’s defense industrial base includes industries providing aircraft servicing and manufacture, and the production of mini-submarines, missiles, vehicles, mortars, artillery, small arms, mines, multiple rocket launchers, and ammunition. Iran lacks strong technical expertise, and the absence of a well-developed industrial and research infrastructure has inhibited Iran from indigenously developing and manufacturing advanced armaments. This weakness has given impetus to the strengthening of Iran’s electronics industry as a main pillar of the future defense industrial base.

Iran’s economy deteriorated in the aftermath of revolution, collapsing oil prices, and war, that dictated greater state control over resources, means of production, and responsibility for domestic services. The situation has been aggravated by the population explosion. Internal deadlock in Iran between protectionist advocates vs. free trade proponents has made it difficult to move forward and to create funds for investment in technology and infrastructure. Arms imports have received significant expenditures to date. How long Iran will be able to continue its import-dependent armament strategy is an issue.

Iran fears economic and technological isolation from a world in which other distinct economic poles have developed that, with the exception of oil revenues, have resulted in little benefit to the Middle East. This has been a principal driving force in Iran’s push toward self-sufficiency, and also to move to establish regional efforts to overcome the effects of isolationism.

Iran’s armament strategy, coupled with its actual infrastructure capabilities, have created an armament situation with several internal contradictions. Indigenous capacity to produce lower technology weaponry has advanced. Iran is still import-dependent for advanced technology systems and their maintenance and may have a long-way to go before actually obtaining an indigenous capability for these systems. Ballistic missiles are a main focus, but still with help from abroad.

Iran Navy

2009-08-09T00:11:00.001-07:00

The Iranian navy has always been the smallest of its three principle services, having about 14,500 personnel in 1986, down from 30,000 in 1979. Throughout the 1970s, the role of the navy expanded as Iran recognized the need to defend the region's vital sea-lanes. By 2008 there were 18,000 naval personnel. The navy is perhaps Iran’s most important military service. The Persian Gulf must remain open for Iranian commerce since the Gulf is the primary route for all of Iran’s oil exports and most of its trade. However, Iran’s current navy structure is outdated and in need of substantial modernization, an effort that Iran is gradually attempting to accomplish. For the present, Iran’s naval capacity remains limited and barely supports its status as essentially a coastal defense force. Iran's economic dependence on the free and interrupted use of the Persian Gulf for its commercial shipping combined with its past lessons in confrontations with the United States Navy in the 1987-88 time frame have reinforced Iran’s determination to rebuild its naval forces.

The navy has its headquarters at Bandar-e Abbas. In 1977 the bulk of the fleet was shifted from Khorramshahr to the newly completed base at Bandar-e Abbas, the new naval headquarters. Bushehr was the other main base. Smaller facilities were located at Khorramshahr, Khark Island, and Bandar-e Khomeini (formerly known as Bandar-e Shahpur). Bandar-e Anzelli (formerly known as Bandar-e Pahlavi) was the major training base and home of the small Caspian fleet, which consisted of a few patrol boats and a minesweeper. The naval base at Bandar Beheshti (formerly known as Chah Bahar) on the Gulf of Oman had been under construction since the late 1970s and in late 1987 still was not completed. Smaller facilities were located near the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian naval operations are organized into five major zones, three on the Persian Gulf (Bandar Abbas, Bushehr and Khark), one on the Caspian Sea (Bandar Anzali), and one on the Indian Ocean (Chah Bahar). Bandar Abbas is the main Iranian naval base, providing a home for the main components of Iran's navy (its frigates and destroyers), as well as functioning as the navy's main ship repair yard. Bandar Anzali has become increasingly important, having minesweeping and full coastal water defense capabilities. Nou Shahr, also on the Caspian, is increasingly important, housing the Iranian naval academy.

The Navy's airborne component, including an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and minesweeping helicopter squadron and a transport battalion, continued to operate in 1986 despite wartime losses. Of six P-3F Orion antisubmarine aircraft, perhaps two remained operational, and of twenty SH-3D ASW helicopters, possibly only ten were airworthy. Despite overall losses, the navy increased the number of its marine battalions from two to three between 1979 and 1986.

Iranian naval forces held several exercises in early 2001 to improve their capabilities and also have had exchange visits with Pakistan and India. As a result, defense officials called for the consolidation of Iran's commercial and military fleets to increase their strengths, overcome any weaknesses, take advantage of opportunities, and address future threats. Iranian naval forces held the three-day Fath-9 exercises in the northern end of the Persian Gulf in Mahshahr during the first week of March 2001. These exercises involved 6,000 people from the regular navy and air force, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps navy and air corps, the Basij Resistance Forces, and the Law Enforcement Forces.

Iran's navy as of 2000 had 20,000 men, but they were young and inexperienced, and most of them were riflemen and marines based on Persian Gulf islands. At higher levels, there had been a fierce rivalry between the IRGC and regular navies for scarce resources. Due to these shortcomings, Iran's three Kilo-class submarines would be vulnerable, and they were limited to laying mines in undefended waters. Mines, however, are one area in which Iran had made advances. It can produce non-magnetic, free-floating, and remote-controlled mines. It may have taken delivery of pressure, acoustic, and magnetic mines from Russia. Also, Iran was negotiating with China for rocket-propelled rising mines.

Iran's navy had held more than a week of war games in the Persian Gulf using tactical submarines and small vessels carrying missile launchers. The March 2007 exercises were the latest in a series of maneuvers staged by Iran's military in the Persian Gulf, where the United States had deployed two aircraft carriers in recent months, a move widely seen as a warning to Tehran over its nuclear ambitions. Though Iran cannot come close to matching US forces, it could cause trouble for shipping in the Persian Gulf and disrupt the flow of oil in the waterway through which 40% of the world's traded oil flows.

Despite having a submarine capability, in the 1990s Iran's navy is neither the best equipped nor the strongest in the region. Upon the acquisition of the Kilo-class submarines by the Iranian Navy, Saudi Arabia arranged for delivery of three upgraded La Fayette-type frigates (armed with anti-ship and anti- aircraft missiles, torpedo tubes and anti- submarine warfare helicopters) and one new Sandown-class coastal minesweeper. Iran's Navy, one of the region's most capable, can temporarily disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz using a layered force of KILO Class diesel submarines, ship- and shore-based antiship cruise missiles and naval mines.

Army / Islamic Iranian Ground Forces (IIGF)

2009-08-09T00:08:00.000-07:00

In 1979, the year the Shah fell, the army experienced a 60-percent desertion from its ranks. By 1986 the regular army was estimated to have a strength of 305,000 troops. By 2004 the Iranian Army had some 350,000 men (200,000 conscripts). These force numbers remained relatively static by 2008, where the Army had 130,000 regular soldiers and 220,000 conscripts.

In the fervor of the Revolution and in the light of numerous changes affecting conscripts and reservists, the army underwent a structural reorganization. Under the Shah, the army had been deployed in 6 divisions and 4 specialized combat regiments supported by more than 500 helicopters and 14 hovercraft. The Shah's relationship with the West and border disputes with Iraq had led to the development of a military geared toward fighting conventional land conflict, and not necessarily suited to Iran's domestic needs or capacity. An 85-percent readiness rate was usually credited to the force, although some outside observers doubted this claim.

After the mid-1970s, military manpower was unevenly deployed. Nearly 80 percent of Iran's ground forces were deployed along the Iraqi border, although official sources maintained that the military was capable of rapid redeployment. Although air force transports were used extensively, redeployment was slow after the start of the war. The Mashhad division headquarters, in the eastern part of the country, remained important because of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan and resulting Afghan migration into Iran.

Following the Revolution the army was renamed the Islamic Iranian Ground Forces (IIGF) and in 1987 was organized as follows: three mechanized divisions, each with three brigades (each of which in turn was composed of three armored and six mechanized battalions), seven infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, one Special Forces division composed of four brigades, one Air Support Command, and some independent armored brigades including infantry and a "coastal force." There was also in reserve, the Qods battalion, composed of ex-servicemen.

Force structure, order of battle, and unit identifications for Iranian forces differed greatly among sources. It was unclear which identifications were accurate. The evolution of Iranian units over time was somewhat opaque, and rather dated wartime designations have often been published, sometimes confusing brigades with division-sized units. During the Iran-Iraq war some Brigades formed the nuclei of new divisions, and presumably reverted with the end of the war.

The regular army also had a number of independent brigades and groups, though there was almost no reliable data on the size and number of these smaller independent formations. These included several small armor units, an infantry brigade, an airborne brigade, two or three special forces brigades, and five artillery brigades/regiments. There were also coastal defense units, a growing number of air defense groups, between four and six army aviation units, and a growing number of logistics and supply formations.

The land forces had six major garrisons and 13 major casernes. There was a military academy at Tehran, and a signal training center in Shiraz. The airborne and special forces also trained at a facility in Shiraz.

The army's aviation unit, whose main operational facilities were located at Esfahan, was largely equipped with United States aircraft, although some helicopters were of Italian manufacture. In 1986 army aviation operated some 65 light fixed-wing aircraft, but its strength lay in its estimated 320 combat helicopters, down from 720 in 1980.

There were a variety of other reports of doubtful veracity. Some sources claimed that small light formations in the regular army included an Airmobile Forces Group created after the Iran-Iraq War. This formation was said to include the 29th Special Forces Division, which was formed in 1993-1994, and the 55th Paratroop Division. Other sources claim that the commando forces of the regular army and IRGC were integrated into a Corps of about 30,000 soldiers, with integrated helicopter lift and air assault capabilities. These airborne and special forces troops were said to train together at Shiraz.

By 2004 the Army was organized in four corps, with four armored divisions, six infantry divisions, two commando brigades, an airborne brigade and other smaller independent formations. Each Iranian division had a different organization. Only the 92nd Division had enough equipment to be a true armored division, and two of the armored divisions were much larger than the others. The 28th and 84th infantry divisions were much more heavily mechanized than the others. Smaller formations in the army included the 23rd Special Forces Division, established in 1993-1994, and the 55th Paratroop Division. One source reported that the 23rd Special Forces Division was the most professional unit in the Iranian Army, with 5,000 regulars soldiers and no conscripts.

Qods (Jerusalem) Force

2009-08-09T00:07:00.000-07:00

While the Constitution of Iran entrusts the military with guarding Iran's territorial integrity and political independence, it gives the Revolutionary Guard [Pasdaran] the responsibility of guarding the Revolution itself. Established under a decree issued by Khomeini on May 5, 1979, the Pasdaran was intended to guard the Revolution and to assist the ruling clerics in the day-to-day enforcement of the government's Islamic codes and morality. The Revolution also needed to rely on a force of its own rather than borrowing the previous regime's tainted units.

By 1986, the Pasdaran consisted of 350,000 personnel organized in battalion-size units that operated either independently or with units of the regular armed forces. In 1986 the Pasdaran acquired small naval and air elements. By 1996 the ground and naval forces were reported to number 100,000 and 20,000, respectively.

Domestic Operations
The Pasdaran has maintained an intelligence branch to monitor the regime's domestic adversaries and to participate in their arrests and trials. Khomeini implied Pasdaran involvement in intelligence when he congratulated the Pasdaran on the arrest of Iranian communist Tudeh leaders.

The Baseej (volunteers) come under the control of the Revolutionary Guards. In 1988, up to 900,000 baseej were mobilized. The Baseej allegedly also monitor the activities of citizens, and harass or arrest women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of the body except hands and face, or those who wear makeup. During the year ending in June 1995, they reportedly "notified 907,246 people verbally and issued 370,079 written notices against ‘social corruption’ and arrested 86,190 people, and also broke up 542 ‘corrupt gangs’, arresting their 2,618 members, and seized 86,597 indecent videocassettes and photographs.

The Ashura Brigades force was reportedly created in 1993 after anti-government riots erupted in various Iranian cities and it consists of 17,000 Islamic militia men and women. The Ashura Brigades are reportedly composed of elements of the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) and the Baseej volunteer militia.

In August 1994, some Pasdaran units, rushed to quell riots in the city of Ghazvin, 150 km. west of Tehran, reportedly refused orders from the Interior Minister to intervene in the clashes, which left more than 30 people dead, 400 wounded and over 1,000 arrested.

Subsequently, senior officers in the army, air force and the usually loyal Islamic Revolutionary Guard reportedly stated that they would no longer order their troops into battle to quell civil disorder. A Pasdaran commander was among four senior army officers who are said to have sent a letter to the country's political leadership, warning the clerical rulers against "using the armed forces to crush civilian unrest and internal conflicts." In a communiqué sent to Ayatollah Ali Khameini, stated that "the role of the country’s armed forces is to defend its borders and to repel foreign enemies from its soil, not to control the internal situation or to strengthen one political faction above another." They are said to have then recommended the use of Baseej volunteers for this purpose. In a move believed to indicate a shift in the trust of the ruling clerics from the Pasdaran to the Baseej volunteer force, on 17 April 1995 Ayatollah Ali Khameini reportedly promoted a civilian, veterinary surgeon Hassan Firuzabadi, to the rank of full general, placing him above both Brigadier-General Mohsen Rezai, commander-in-chief of the Pasdaran and Brigadier General Ali Shahbazi of the regular armed forces.

Foreign Operations
The foreign operations by the Guardians, which also encompass the activities of Hizballah and Islamic Jihad – are usually carried out through the Committee on Foreign Intelligence Abroad and the Committee on Implementation of Actions Abroad. As with agents of Ministry of Intelligence, Pasdaran personnel operate through front companies and non-governmental organizations, employees or officials of trading companies, banks, cultural centers or as representatives of the Foundation of the Oppressed and Dispossessed (Bonyade-e- Mostafazan), or the Martyrs Foundation.

The Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is responsible for extraterritorial operations, including terrorist operations. A primary focus for the Qods Force is training Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. Currently, the Qods Force conducts training activities in Iran and in Sudan. The Qods Force is also responsible for gathering information required for targeting and attack planning. The Pasdaran has contacts with underground movements in the Gulf region, and Pasdaran members are assigned to Iranian diplomatic missions, where, in the course of routine intelligence activities they monitor dissidents. Pasdaran influence has been particularly important in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.

The largest branch of Pasdaran foreign operations consists of approximately 12,000 Arabic speaking Iranians, Afghans, Iraqis, Lebanese shi’ites and North Africans who trained in Iran or received training in Afghanistan during the Afghan war years. Presently these foreign operatives receive training in Iran, Sudan and Lebanon, and include the Hizballah ["Party of Allah"] intelligence, logistics and operational units in Lebanon [Hizballah is primarily a social and political rather than military organization]. The second largest Pasdaran foreign operations relates to the Kurds (particularly Iraqi Kurds), while the third largest relates to the Kashmiri’s, the Balouchi’s and the Afghans. The Pasdaran has also supported the establishment of Hizballah branches in Lebanon, Iraqi Kurdistan, Jordan and Palestine, and the Islamic Jihad in many other Moslem countries including Egypt, Turkey, Chechnya and in Caucasia. Hizballah has been implicated in the counterfeiting of U.S. dollars and European currencies, both to finance its operations and to disrupt Western economies by impairing international trade and tourism.

The Office of Liberation Movements has established a Gulf Section tasked with forming a Gulf Battalion as part of the Jerusalem Forces. In April 1995 a number of international organizations linked to international terrorism -- including the Japanese Red Army, the Armenian Secret Army, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party -- were reported to have met in Beirut with representatives of the Iraqi Da'wah Party, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, Hizballah, Iran's "Office of Liberation Movements," and Iran's Guardians of the Revolution. Tehran's objective was to destabilize Arab Gulf states by supporting fundamentalists with military, financial, and logistical support. Members of these and other organizations receive military training at a Guardians of the Revolution facility some 100 kilometers south of Tehran. A variety of of training courses are conducted at the facility for fundamentalists from the Gulf states, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon, including naval operations, mines, and diving operations in a special camp near the Orontes River.

The State Department asserts that Iran supports the Lebanese Hizballah, as well as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, groups labeled as foreign terrorist organizations that are active in Israel.

Hizballah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qasim appeared to confirm the importance of Iran to his organization during a late-July ceremony in the town of Tulin, when he said "We must stand side by side against the Israeli enemy, because Lebanon's strength is part of Syria's strength, and Iran's support and [Hizballah's] support for Palestine are an honor for us."

In January of 2002 - Israeli forces seized a Tonga-registered vessel, and found onboard 83 canisters - which were hidden in crates and among other cargo - and filled with 50 tons of weapons - including surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank mines. Intelligence reports indicate the likely involvement of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in facilitating this large arms transfer to other terrorist groups.

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003: Islamic Revolutionary Guard and Ministry of Intelligence and Security personnel were involved in planning and support for terrorist acts. Although Iran detained al-Qaida operatives in 2003, it refused to identify senior members in custody. Tehran continued to encourage anti-Israel activities, both operationally and rhetorically, providing logistic support and training to Lebanese Hizballah and a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups.

During 2003, Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and operationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei praised Palestinian resistance operations, and President Khatami reiterated Iran’s support for the “wronged people of Palestine” and their struggles. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups -- notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command -- with funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. Iran hosted a conference in August 2003 on the Palestinian intifadah, at which an Iranian official suggested that the continued success of the Palestinian resistance depended on suicide operations.

Iran pursued a variety of policies in Iraq aimed at securing Tehran’s perceived interests there, some of which ran counter to those of the Coalition. Iran has indicated support for the Iraqi Governing Council and promised to help Iraqi reconstruction.

Shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein, individuals with ties to the Revolutionary Guard may have attempted to infiltrate southern Iraq, and elements of the Iranian Government have helped members of Ansar al-Islam transit and find safehaven in Iran. In a Friday Prayers sermon in Tehran in May 2003, Guardian Council member Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati publicly encouraged Iraqis to follow the Palestinian model and participate in suicide operations against Coalition forces.

Iran is a party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Anonymous sources in the Israeli defense establishment said that Iranian involvement in terrorism in the occupied territories has increased. These activities mostly are run through Hizballah in Lebanon and, between 2002 and 2004 Hizballah had tripled or even quadrupled the scope of its operations in the territories. The threat to Israel from rockets provided to Hizballah by Iran and Syria has grown, both in range and quantity. Iran is supplying an array of rockets by air and sea and overland from Syria, while both countries are providing logistical support and training as well. Israeli Defense Forces intelligence chief Major-General Aharon Ze'evi-Farkash said on 2 September 2004, "we are dealing with a threat on the northern front. That also means Hizballah and Iran, as well as Syria."

Iran Sipah

2009-08-09T00:04:00.000-07:00

The 125,000 strong Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG or Pasdaran) secures the revolutionary regime and provides training support to terrorist groups throughout the region and abroad. Both the regular military (the Artesh) and IRGC are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This new ministry, established in 1989, was first headed by Akbar Torkan, a civilian and a former head of the defense industries establishment. MODAFL curtailed the institutional autonomy of the IRGC and brought it under the overall defense umbrella. The IRGC Ministry was scrapped, and its command structures were brought within the new MODAFL.

The IRGC was formed following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in an effort to consolidate several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new regime and to function as a counter to the influence and power of the regular military, initially seen as a potential source of opposition and loyalty to the Shah. From the beginning of the new Islamic regime, the Pasdaran (Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami) functioned as a corps of the faithful. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic entrusted the defense of Iran's territorial integrity and political independence to the military, while it gave the Pasdaran the responsibility of preserving the Revolution itself.

Days after Khomeini's return to Tehran, the Bazargan interim administration established the Pasdaran under a decree issued by Khomeini on 5 May 1979. The Pasdaran was intended to protect the Revolution and to assist the ruling clerics in the day-to-day enforcement of the new government's Islamic codes and morality. There were other, perhaps more important, reasons for establishing the Pasdaran. The Revolution needed to rely on a force of its own rather than borrowing the previous regime's tainted units. As one of the first revolutionary institutions, the Pasdaran helped legitimize the Revolution and gave the new regime an armed basis of support. Moreover, the establishment of the Pasdaran served notice to both the population and the regular armed forces that the Khomeini regime was quickly developing its own enforcement body. Thus, the Pasdaran, along with its political counterpart, Crusade for Reconstruction, brought a new order to Iran. In time, the Pasdaran would rival the police and the judiciary in terms of its functions. It would even challenge the performance of the regular armed forces on the battlefield.

Although the IRGC operated independently of the regular armed forces, it was often considered to be a military force in its own right due to its important role in Iranian defense. The IRGC consists of ground, naval, and aviation troops, which parallel the structure of the regular military. Unique to the Pasdaran, however, has been control of Iran's strategic missile and rocket forces.

Also contained under the umbrella of the more conventional Pasdaran, were the Basij Forces (Mobilization Resistance Force), a network of potentially up to a million active individuals who could be called upon in times of need. The Basij could be committed to assist in the defense of the country against internal or external threats, but by 2008 had also been deployed in mobilizing voters in elections and alleged tampering during such activities. Another element was the Qods Force, a special forces element tasked with unconventional warfare roles and known to be involved providing assistance and training to various militant organizations around the world. In 2005 Iran had about 150 Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel in Lebanon, military advisers in Sudan, and three observers with the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Yahya Rahim Safavi [aka Rahim SAFAVI, aka Sayed YAHYA SAFAVI, aka Yahia RAHIM SAFAWI, aka Yahya Rahim AL-SIFAWI, aka Yahya Rahim SAFAVI, aka Yahya RAHIM-SAFAVI ], head of the IRGC since 1997, was dismissed as commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards ( Pasdarans ) in August 2007. The dismissal of general Yahya Rahim Safavi disrupted the balance of power in Iran to the advantage of conservatives. Analysis in the international press considered the removal of Yahya Rahim Safavi to be a sign of change in the defense strategies of Iran, but the general policies of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are not personally determined by its commander.

There were rumors pointing to a deep conflict between Yahya Rahim Safavi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but these were not well founded. By one account the new head of the Revolutionary Guard, Ali Jafari, was from a conservative sub-faction opposed to the more radical elements allied with Ahmadinejad. The former Guard head Yahya Rahim-Safavi, was said to be too openly sympathetic to the president. Others argued to the contrary that the hard-liners had counterattacked by installing a new head of the Revolutionary Guard who had written on revitalizing the Islamic revolution, worldwide. By this account Safavi was reportedly critical of Ahmadinejad, whereas Jafari was said to be a close associate of the President. A third view was that Khamenei's decision to replace Yahya Rahim-Safavi complied with the general rule of authoritarian regimes to rotate senior military commanders in order to prevent the rise of powerful military rivals. In any event, Safavi was appointed advisor and senior aide for armed forces affairs to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei on September 1, 2007.

Safavi was replaced on 31 August 2007 by his long-standing rival, Mohamed Ali Jaafari Sahrourdi, also the head of the Basij Islamist militia forces. Jafari, (also known as Aziz or Ali Jafari), held certain theories about this institution. These theories ranged from very small matters such as whether the Basij should be a subdivision of the Revolutionary Guard’s Ground Forces, concentrating all power to the Guard and thereby minimizing the independence that exists in each of the factions of the armed forces, to matters at the core of Guard’s strategies and research. In his first press conference after being appointed to the post, he emphasized the issue of an unconventional warfare and the experience of Iraq. His speech was prominently aimed at explaining the theory of "asymmetric defense". During the previous two years as Ali Larijani became the secretary general of the Supreme National Security Council, General Jafari had been in close collaboration with him on research and strategic matters such as defense, the army, Iraq, the nuclear dossier, etc.

Jafari's appointment assigned the fate of the Islamic Republic to someone with a hands-on record in combating internal dissent. Jafari had spent nearly 15 years (from 1991-92 to 2005) as commander of the IRGC land forces, and had been head of its new Strategic Center, which has focused on the US military. General Jafari said on 20 October 2007 that the "Guards' primary mission at this juncture is to fight the internal threats." This reflected a new direction for the IRGC handed down from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and honed at the IRGC's Strategic Research Center, created in 2005, with Jafari at its head. Jafari's appointment suggested to some that Tehran took talk of possible US military action against Iran very seriously.

Jafari spoke to the press on September 3 and said the IRGC's role is to "expand" the deterrence capability against "the enemies of Iran and the revolution" without an exclusively military role. He said the IRGC will "hasten" to help other institutions in Iran "where necessary". Jafari added that Iran's "environmental conditions" have changed, and the IRGC needs to be flexible in facing new threats to Iran. The new commander assured reporters that the IRGC is better prepared than in the past to face these threats, and with the necessary intelligence on "enemies" and a considerable ballistic capability. He urged "the enemies" to leave the Middle East region and choose instead an "interaction" with Islamic states.

In late July 2008 reports originating with Iranian Resistance network said that the IRGC was in the process of dramatically changing its structure. In a shake-up, in September 2008 Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (Pasdarans) established 31 divisions and an autonomous missile command. The reported new structure was largely decentralized, with the force broken into 31 provincal corps, possibly to reflect a far greater internal role, with one for each of Iran's 31 Provinces.

Air Fields and Bases

2009-08-08T23:59:00.000-07:00

Air Force headquarters is located at Doshan Tapeh Air Base, near Tehran. Iran's largest air base, Mehrabad, outside Tehran, was also the country's major civil airport. Other major operational air bases are at Tabriz, Bandar-e Abbas, Hamadan (Shahroki Air Base), Dezful (Vahdati Air Base), Shiraz, and Bushehr. Since 1980 air bases at Ahvaz, Esfahan (Khatami Air Base), and Bandar Beheshti have also become operational. The Air Force's primary maintenance facility is located at Mehrabad Air Base. The nearby Iran Aircraft Industries, in addition to providing main overhaul backup for the maintenance unit, have been active in manufacturing spare parts.

There are 26 domestic airports in Iran which operate round-the-clock, six international airports, and six airfields for the National Iranian Oil Company. Another eight airports were being built in various parts of Iran by private investors. The international airports are: Tehran Mehrabad Airport, Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashad, Tabriz, Bandar Abbas. Others are in Bushehr, Bandar Lengeh, Kish Island, Kerman, Rasht, Chahbahar, Ahvaz, Urumieh, Baakhtaran, Birjand, Zabol, Iranshahr, Laar, Khorramabad, Hamedan, Sanandaj, Raamsar and Noshahr.

The Iranian Air Force is broken into three command areas: Western, Southern, and Eastern. The Western Area Command consists of: Tehran (Mehrabad and Doshan-Tappeh), Tabriz, Hamadan, Dezful, Umidiyeh, Shiraz, and Isfahan. The Southern Area Command consists of: Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, and Chah Bahar. The Eastern Area Command consists of: Zahedan, Tehran (Ghale Morghi), and Shiraz's training squadron.

+NAME Location Type Coordinates

1st TAB @ Mehrabad IAP Tehran AIRB 35 41 19.42N 51 18 46.67E
2nd TAB @Tabriz Tabriz AIRB 38 07 44.99N 46 14 24.97E
3rd TAB @ Shahrokhi AB Hamadan AIRB 35 12 37.58N 48 39 12.60E
4th TAB @ Vahdati AB Dezful AIRB 32 25 57.28N 48 24 07.66E
5th TAB @ Umidiyeh/Aghajari Umidiyeh AIRB 30 49 51.88N 49 32 35.26E
6th TAB @ Bushehr Bushehr AIRB 28 56 45.66N 50 49 42.15E
7th TAB @ Shiraz Shiraz AIRB 29 32 11.24N 52 35 18.26E
8th TAB @ Khatami AB Esfahan AIRB 32 44 49.36N 51 51 17.62E
9th TAB @ Bandar Abbas Bandar Abbas AIRB 27 12 58.83N 56 22 50.43E
10th TAB @ Chahbahar Chahbahar AIRB 25 26 41.87N 60 22 55.10E
11th TAB @ Ghale Morghi Tehran AIRB 35 38 35.80N 51 23 05.73E
12th TAB @ Doshan Tappeh Tehran AIRB 35 41 46.69N 51 28 32.97E
13th TAB @ Zahedan Zahedan AIRB 29 28 27.46N 60 54 40.94E
14th TAB @ Mashhad Mashhad AIRB 36 14 07.73N 59 38 38.15E
Badr Esfahan AIRB 32 37 15.68N 51 41 48.41E
Kermanshah Kermanshah AIRB 34 20 47.10N 47 09 23.70E
Kerman, Forudgah-e Kerman AIRB 30 15 57.77N 56 57 34.33E
Masjed Soleiman Masjed
Soleiman AIRB 31 59 54.86N 49 16 16.67E
Other Airfields
Abadan Abadan AIRF 30 21 52.17N 48 13 52.98E
Abdanan Abadan AIRF 32 56 01.06N 47 29 08.76E
Ahmadi Ahmadi AIRF 29 05 43.76N 51 02 11.16E
Ahvaz Ahvaz AIRF 31 20 13.54N 48 45 40.75E
Bandar Lengeh Bandar
Lengeh AIRF 26 31 53.89N 54 49 17.51E
Darrahi Sadabad AIRF 29 22 24.02N 51 04 03.44E
Gachsaran Gachsaran AIRF 30 20 12.74N 50 49 38.00E
Gorgan, Forudgah-e AIRP
Gorreh Gorreh AIRF 29 54 21.73N 50 25 31.69E
Ilam Ilam AIRF 33 37 33.45N 46 25 05.07E
Jalnabad AIRF
Jask Jask AIRF 25 39 21.50N 57 47 54.45E
Kish Island Jazireh-e Kish AIRF 26 31 33.25N 53 58 52.19E
Khanian AIRP
Khoramabad Khoramabad AIRF 33 25 57.69N 48 17 32.95E
Manzariyeh Kushk-e
Norsat AIRF 34 58 35.09N 50 48 14.56E
Maragheh Maragheh /
Benab AIRF 37 20 52.79N 46 07 34.55E
Orumiyeh Orumiyeh /
Sheykh Sar
Mast AIRF 37 40 15.53N 45 04 19.95E
Parsabad AIRF
Qazvin Qazvin AIRF 36 14 24.71N 50 03 02.32E
Qezel Qeshl Ag AIRF
Qushchi AIRP
Rasht Rasht AIRF 37 19 25.79N 49 36 32.99E
Ramsar Sakht Sar AIRF 36 54 31.82N 50 40 47.84E
Shahabad Eslamabad-e
Gharb AIRF 34 04 07.88N 46 36 07.41E
Vayqan AIRF
Yazd Yazd AIRF 31 53 45.55N 54 16 38.99E

Iran AirForce

2009-08-08T23:56:00.000-07:00

The US-trained Iranian Imperial Air Force was widely regarded as second only to Israel's in the Middle East — more than a match for Iraq and a serious adversary for even the Soviet Union. At its peak the Imperial Iranian Air Force, that of the Shah, had more than 450 modern combat aircraft, including then state of the art F-14A Tomcat fighters and about 5,000 well-trained pilots. On the eve of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 the Air Force, numbering close to 100,000 personnel, was by far the most advanced of the three Iranian military services and among the most impressive air forces in the developing world. Reliable information on the Air Force after the Revolution was difficult to obtain, but it seemed clear that by 1987 a fairly large number of the existing fleet had been cannibalized for spare parts.

A total of 14 air bases were operational: Ahvaz, Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Chan Bahar, Dezful, Doshan Tapeh (Tehran), Ghaleh Morghi (Tehran), Hamadan, Isfahan, Mashhad, Mehrabad (Tehran), Shiraz, Tabriz and Zahedan. Soviet and Chinese-made aircraft, obtained following the Iranian Revolution were distributed throughout the country to fufill mission roles of ground attack, transport, training and interception. Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Dezful, Hamadan, Tabriz and Mehrabad became the centers for ground attack squadrons. Shiraz was the home of the interceptor squadron. It also provided training along with, Mehrabad, Doshan Tapeh and Isfahan. Shiraz also housed the transport squadron.

Air Force headquarters was located at Doshan Tapeh Air Base, near Tehran. Iran's largest air base, Mehrabad, outside Tehran, was also the country's major civil airport. Other major operational air bases were at Tabriz, Bandar-e Abbas, Hamadan (Shahroki Air Base), Dezful (Vahdati Air Base), Shiraz, and Bushehr. Since 1980 air bases at Ahvaz, Esfahan (Khatami Air Base), and Bandar Beheshti had also become operational. The Air Force's primary maintenance facility was located at Mehrabad Air Base. The nearby Iran Aircraft Industries, in addition to providing main overhaul backup for the maintenance unit, was active in manufacturing spare parts.

Before the Revolution, the Air Force was organized into 15 squadrons with fighter and fighter-bomber capabilities and a single reconnaissance squadron. In addition, 1 tanker squadron, and 4 medium and 1 light transport squadron provided impressive logistical support. By 1986 desertions and depletions led to a reorganization of the Air Force into 8 squadrons again with fighter and fighter-bomber capabilities and 1 reconnaissance squadron. This reduced force was supported by 2 joint tanker-transport squadrons and 5 light transport squadrons. Some 76 helicopters and 5 surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons supplemented this capability.

From its inception, the Air Force also assumed responsibility for air defense. The existing early warning systems, built in the 1950s under the auspices of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), were upgraded in the 1970s with a modern air defense radar network. To complement the ground radar component and provide a blanket coverage of the Gulf region, the United States also agreed to sell Iran 7 Boeing 707 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in late 1977. Following the Revolution, Washington canceled the AWACS sale, claiming that this sensitive equipment might be compromised. Finally, the Air Force's 3 SAM battalions and 8 Improved HAWK battalions were reorganized in the mid-1980s (in a project involving more than 1,800 missiles) into 5 squadrons that also contained Rapiers and Tigercats of British origin. Washington's sale of HAWK spare parts and missiles in 1985 and 1986 may have enhanced this capability.

The Iranian air force never fully recovered from the effects of the 1979 revolution. At the beginning of the war, pilots were in short supply and flying proficiency was markedly lower than before the revolution. U.S. technicians who left Iran during the days preceding the fall of the Shah succeeded in erasing inventory records, ripping avionics packages out of F-14 aircraft, and destroying caches of repair parts at bases around Iran.

The clerics purged a large part of the conventional military structure after the 1979 revolution leaving the military broken and barely able to defend Iran from the initial Iraqi ground invasion in 1980. After Khomeini seized power on 11 February 1979, the revolutionary regime regarded the Air Force as a waste of money that rightfully belonged to the mostazafin (poor oppressed masses). One of the new government's first acts was a purge of the armed forces, particularly the officer corps, which was (probably correctly) thought to be a hotbed of monarchist sentiment. The Air Force, where virtually the entire fighting element — the combat pilots — was composed of officers, was especially hard hit. To make matters worse, Iran's best combat pilots had been trained in the United States and Israel, making them particularly suspect.

The senior command echelon of the IIAF had been decapitated in 1979 and early 1980 by arrests, imprisonments, executions, purges, and forced exiles. A failed coup that originated on Shahrokhi Air Base in Hamadan in June 1980 brought about another sweeping purge. Many IIAF personnel were shot or jailed for suspected or real complicity in the coup attempt, and the purge of personnel whose ultimate loyalty was suspect continued at a faster pace.

The result of these actions was an Iranian air force which faced considerable problems maintaining its planes and combat capabilities. Iran husbanded the few air assets it had for strategic missions at the expense of tactical and operational fires. While suffering from poor maintenance and lack of spare parts, the Iranian Air Force was able to launch a surprising counterattack just days after Iraqi preemptive strikes on Iranian air fields. They also launched a major airlift using Boeing 747, 707, and C-130 aircraft to move conventional forces to the front.

The Iranian Air Force, equipped with Maverick missiles, proved critical during the initial defense by attacking Iraqi ground forces. The Iranian air force operated aggressively at the beginning of the war, providing both close air support and battlefield interdiction in support of Iranian ground forces. An example of this level of support occurred on October 3, 1981 when Iranian planes hit a large Iraqi armor formation massing in central Khuzistan.

Iran also made effective use of attack helicopters. Helicopters were the primary Iranian anti-armor system, and Iran scoured the international arms market for TOW missiles for its helicopter gunships. As the war progressed, Iran increasingly relied on army aviation to support ground operations, while the air force concentrated on strategic countervalue targets.

When the Iran-Iraq War started in 1980, Iran's F-14s, equipped with Phoenix missiles, capable of identifying and destroying six targets simultaneously from a range of 80 kilometers or more, inflicted heavy casualties on the Iraqi air force, which was forced to disperse its aircraft to Jordan and Oman. The capability of the F-14s and F-4s was enhanced by the earlier acquisition of a squadron of Boeing 707 tankers, thereby extending their combat radius to 2,500 kilometers with in-flight refueling.

Iranian F-14 Tomcats were also used like miniature AWACS, reporting Iraqi fighter operations to Iranian air defense commanders with their powerful radars. In response, Iraqi Mirage F-1EQ fighters flew high-speed, low-altitude profiles, well below the Tomcat's radar limits. The F-1EQ would pop up directly beneath the Tomcat's orbit, briefly illuminate the F-14 with its radar, and fire one or two air-to-air missiles at it. Iran lost several Tomcats to these tactics.

Iran began the war with HAWK surface-to-air missile defenses, though these were largely for the defense of fixed military facilities. Iran's doctrine emphasized active air defense using aircraft like the F-14. Iran failed to use its HAWKs effectively during the war, failing even to mount an effective point defense of key oil facilities. This may have been affected by the general disruption in the military establishment following the Shah's fall. There were only a few confirmed Iranian HAWK kills of Iraqi aircraft.

The Iraqi Air Force's first real strategic bombing campaign was the so-called war of the cities, which aimed at breaking civilian morale and disrupting military targets. Iraq's two efforts early in 1985, from 14 March to 7 April 1985 and 25 May to 15 June 1985, were reportedly very effective. Opposition from the Iranian Air Force was negligible to nonexistent, as the Iraqis hit air bases and military and industrial targets all over Iran (in Tabriz, Urmia, Rasht, Bakhteran, Hamadan, Tehran, Isfahan, Dezful, Ahvaz, Kharg, Bushehr, and Shiraz). Even Iraq's lumbering old Tu-16 bombers were getting through, presumably with MiG-25 and Mirage F-1 escorts, as the Iraqis hit targets as far away as Kashan, more than 360 miles from their own bases. According to local residents, conditions in Tehran during the Iraqi bombings were very difficult. Fires blazed out of control as firefighters struggled with low pressure from broken water mains. Tehran’s hospitals overflowed with casualties. The daily toll was reckoned "in the hundreds," and there were frequent emergency radio appeals for blood donors.

By 1987, the Air Force faced a new problem, one of an acute shortage of spare parts and replacement equipment. Perhaps 35 of the 190 Phantoms were serviceable in 1986. One F-4 had been shot down by Saudi F-15s, and two pilots had defected to Iraq with their F-4s in 1984. The number of F-5s dwindled from 166 to perhaps 45, and the F-14 Tomcats from 77 to perhaps 10. The latter were hardest hit because maintenance posed special difficulties after the United States embargo on military sales.

In the "Tanker War", Iran proved unable to protect Kharg Island and its other oil facilities from attack by the Iraqi air force. As a consequence, Iran responded by doing the only thing it could - mining the waters of the Persian Gulf and risking international ire by attacking neutral shipping.

Iran's national will was decisively engaged by Iraqi missile attacks on Tehran and other large Iranian population centers during the "War of the Cities." The Iranian people were demoralized by repeated Iraqi missile attacks on their cities. As an illustration of this, more than one million people fled Tehran during the second "War of the Cities" in 1988.

With the onset of Desert Storm in 1991, reports suggested that more than 350 advanced aircraft were bought or made operational including, Russian Mig-27s, -29s, -31s, Tu-22M3 Backfires, Russian Su-24s, -25s, -27s, Il-76 transports, and French Mirage F-1s. Iran purchased a number of Mig-29s (Mig-29A and Mig-29UB trainers) from what was then the Soviet Union, and aquired a number of others impounded after fleeing Iraq during Desert Storm. Su-24MKs, SU-25Ks, and a number of Il-76 were aquired in the same way.

Iraqi Aircraft
At least 115 combat aircraft flew to Iran from Iraq during Desert Storm, out of the total of 137-149 aircraft flown to Iran or crashed enroute, including military transports and commerical airliners. According to an official Iraqi statement, the combat aircraft included 24 Mirage F-1s, 4 Su-20 Fitters, 40 Su-22 Fitters, 24 Su-24 Fencers, seven Su-25 Frogfoots, nine Mig-23 Floggers, and four Mig-29 Fulcrums. Reports that Saddam Hussein ordered 20 Tu-22 bombers to Iran appeared unfounded. The reported orders in 1992 for Mig-27, -31, Su-22, and Tu-22M aircraft were either in error or failed to come to fruition as those aircraft types did not subsequently appear in Iranian inventory. In this period close to $2 billion was reportedly spent on foreign weapons systems.

In 1993 it was reported that Russia was to provide Iran with spare parts, armaments, and operating manuals for the Iraqi jets that flew to Iran during the Gulf War. In 1993 it was also reported that China had bought an unknown number of these Mig-29s from Iran, in exchange for Chinese missile technology and a nuclear power station. The two countries had reportedly reached agreement on the exchange in late 1992, with Iran having delivered some of the Mig-29s by the end of 1992.

In 1998 Iraq and Iran had high-level meetings to discuss ending their state of war and other matters, including Iraq's request to have its airplanes returned. Iran denied it had used any of the Iraqi fighter planes. If Iran had kept the Iraqi planes grounded for the entire time, they were probably nonfunctional. It was also possible that the Iranians might not have been able to start the engines or operate the hydraulics. Other reports suggested that some Su-24s were added to Iran's existing inventory, some Su-20/22s were in Revolutionary Guard service. The Iraqi Su-25s, Mig-23s and Mirage F-1s were thought by some to be not in service, due to age, low capability (Mig-23s) or too few numbers (Su-25). Other reports suggested that Iran had overhauled Iraq's fleet of 24 Mirage F-1EQ fighters and placed them into service. By 2000 reports emerged suggesting that Iran had in fact not incorporated the Mig-23 or Su-20/22 aircraft (at least into their regular Air Force), but had taken the Iraqi Su-24MK, Su-25K, and Mirage F-1EQ aircraft into inventory.

On 05 August 2007 Lieutenant-General Kamal al-Barzanji, Iraq's air force commander, said he hoped Iran would return some of the Iraqi warplanes that fled to Iran ahead of the Gulf War in 1991. He conceded that many of them were probably beyond repair.

Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

2009-08-08T23:54:00.001-07:00

The regular military (the Artesh) and Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRCG or Pasdaran) are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This ministry, established in 1989, was first headed by Akbar Torkan, a civilian and a former head of the defense industries establishment. MODAFL curtailed the institutional autonomy of the IRGC and brought it under the overall defense umbrella. The IRGC Ministry was scrapped, and its command structures were brought within the new MODAFL.

The Ministry of Defense handles administrative matters for the regular armed forces. The chain of command flowed from senior unit commanders (division, wing, and fleet) to intermediate-echelon service commanders and to service commanders in chief and their staffs. Similarly, the Ministry of the Pasdaran (IRGC) handled the administrative affairs of the Pasdaran. The chain of command flowed from senior unit commanders (operational brigades in the case of combat units) to the ministry staff officers. In the case of internal security units, the chain of command went from local commanders to provincial commanders (who were colonels) and then to provincial general commanders (who were generals).

Joint Staff
The Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, composed of officers assigned from the various services, the Pasdaran, the National Police, and the Gendarmerie, was responsible for all operational matters. Its primary tasks included military planning and coordination and operational control over the regular services, combat units of the Pasdaran, and units of the Gendarmerie and National Police assigned to the war front. Joint Staff members were also empowered to integrate fully the regular and paramilitary forces in operational planning. The components of the armed forces Joint Staff were modeled on the United States joint and combined staff system.

Staff members of J1, Personnel and Administration, conducted planning and liaison duties with their counterparts at the ministries of defense, interior, and the Pasdaran. They also supervised budgeting and financial accountability and the preparation of operational budgets for Majlis approval for all the armed services.

Personnel of J2, Intelligence and Security, carried out operational control for intelligence planning, intelligence operations, intelligence training, counterintelligence, and security for all elements of the armed forces. They also handled liaison with the komitehs (revolutionary committees) for internal security matters and with SAVAMA (the Islamic Republic of Iran's successor to the previous intelligence organization SAVAK) for foreign intelligence.

Staff members of J3, Operations and Training, conducted training, operational planning, operations, and communications. The operational planning and operations sections were further divided into eleven subsections for planning and coordination of the services, including: the Iranian Islamic Ground Forces (IIGF), IIGF Aviation, IIGF Chemical Troops, IIGF Artillery Troops, IIGF Engineer Troops, Iranian Islamic Air Force (IIArF), Iranian Islamic Navy (IIN), IIN Aviation, the Pasdaran, the Gendarmerie, and the National Police.

Personnel of J4, Logistics and Support, coordinated and provided liaison for the services. Primary responsibility for logistics and supply rested with the services through the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and the Pasdaran. Collection and coordination of supplies and coordination of transportation to the war front, however, remained under the control of J4.

Staff members of J5, Liaison, handled liaison and coordination with non-military organizations and with those military organizations not covered by Joint Staff-level arrangements. Organizations covered by J5 included the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of the Pasdaran, Office of the Prime Minister, Council of Ministers' Secretariat, SDC, Majlis (particularly the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee), the Foundation for Popular Mobilization, the Foundation for the Disinherited, the Foundation for Martyrs (Bonyad-e Shahid), the Foundation for War Victims, and the Crusade for Reconstruction (Jihad- e Sazandegi or Jihad).

The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate provided legal counsel to the Joint Staff and facilitated liaison with the revolutionary prosecutor general and the military tribunal system of the armed forces. The Political-Ideological Directorate (P-ID) staff members operated the political-ideological bureaus of the Joint Staff components and the political-ideological directorates and bureaus of the operational commands. This office also developed and disseminated political-ideological training materials, in close cooperation with the Foundation for the Propagation of Islam and the Islamic associations of the services. Finally, P-ID members conducted liaison duties between the Joint Staff and the Islamic Revolutionary Court of the Armed Forces.

Members of the Inspectorate General handled oversight functions over the staff components and liaison with the inspectors general of the operational commands. Special Office for Procurements staff members controlled and coordinated procurement of military equipment and supplies from foreign sources through the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Pasdaran, the Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Trade, and the Central Bank of Iran.

Iranian Leadership

2009-08-08T23:49:00.000-07:00

The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a populist revolution toppled the monarchy of Reza Pahlavi, the last of the Pahlavi dynasty. The Constitution, ratified after the revolution by popular referendum, established a theocratic republic and declared as its purpose the establishment of institutions and a society based on Islamic principles and norms. The Government was dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergy. The Head of State, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was designated the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and had direct control over the armed forces, the internal security forces, and the judiciary.

The right of citizens to change their government has been restricted significantly in post-revolution Iran. Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members of the Majles, and the Assembly of Experts. However, the Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, was selected for a life term by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly of Experts could also remove the Supreme Leader. The Assembly itself was restricted to clerics, who served 8-year terms and were chosen by popular vote from a list approved by the Government. There was no separation of state and religion, and clerics have historically dominated the Government of post-revolution Iran. The Government repressed attempts to separate state and religion or to alter the State's theocratic foundation. The Government effectively controlled the selection of candidates for elections, although a bill approved by the Parliament weaken its control.

The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians, composed of six Islamic clergymen and six lay members, who are nominated by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Majles. The Council of Guardians review all laws for consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution. The Council also screens political candidates for ideological, political, and religious suitability. The Constitution provided the Council of Guardians the power to screen and disqualify candidates for elective offices based on an ill-defined set of requirements, including candidates' ideological beliefs. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state. Clerics who disagree with government policies also have been disqualified. For example, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Council of Guardians rejected the candidacy of 145 out of the 356 candidates who filed to run for 17 seats in the special Majles election held concurrently with the Presidential election in June 2001. This constituted a far higher percentage than were rejected in the February 2000 Majles elections. The judiciary was subject to government and religious influence.

In addition to the Council of Guardians there are two other bodies considered part of the Executive branch of government. The Assembly of Experts (Majles-Khebregan) is a popularly elected body charged with determining the succession of the Supreme Leader, reviewing his performance, and deposing him if deemed necessary. The Expediency Council or the Council for the Discernment of Expediency (Majma-e-Tashkise-Maslahat-e-Nezam) exerts supervisory authority over the executive, judicial, and legislative branches and resolves legislative issues on which the Majles and the Council of Guardians disagree and since 1989 has been used to advise national religious leaders on matters of national policy. In 2005 the Council's powers were expanded to act as a supervisory body for the government

A popularly elected 290-seat unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles (also written Majlis), develops and passes legislation. 5 of these seats are reserved for special representatives of officially recognized religious minorities: 2 for Armenian Christians and 1 each for Assyrian Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. In 2005 some 12 women held seats. The speaker presides over parliament, assisted by two deputies and a system of 22 permanent committees. Select committees also can be established when necessary. The Majlis may both propose and pass legislation, and the executive branch cannot dissolve it. Ministers of the cabinet can also present bills. All bills passed by the Majlis must be reviewed by the 12-member Guardians Council for consistency with the constitution and with Islamic principles. The leader and the Majlis each appoint six members of the Guardians Council. If the Guardians Council finds a bill compatible with the constitution and Islam, the bill becomes law. If it finds a bill partially or wholly unconstitutional or un-Islamic, the bill is sent back to the Majlis for revision. In 1987 Khomeini resolved tension that had developed between the Majlis and the Guardians Council by establishing the Expediency Council to resolve disputes between the two. In practice, the Expediency Council has upheld some Guardians Council vetoes, overridden others, and sent back some vetoed legislation with instructions that the Majlis and Guardians Council work out acceptable compromises.

The Constitution provides for freedom of the press, except when published ideas are "contrary to Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights." However, the Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press in practice. After the election of President Khatami in 1997, the independent press, especially newspapers and magazines, played an increasingly important role in providing a forum for an intense debate regarding reform in the society. However, basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression did not exist, and the independent press was subjected to arbitrary enforcement measures by elements of the Government, notably the judiciary, which treated such debates as a threat.

Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution there had been two views within the government of the Islamic Republic. The first view is a radical, conservative, and fundamentalist view which has had a stronger role in directing the government and people of Iran. In foreign policy it sees a conflict in the policies of Iran’s Islamic regime and that of the “aggressive regimes” (as the government calls them) headed by America. The second viewpoint believes in Islam and the Revolution but at the same time it is a moderate viewpoint. Rafsanjani is with the moderate forces. But Rafsanjani owed a part of his success to Mr. Ahmadinejad, because of the way Mr. Ahmadinejad and his clerical supports entered the fray and campaigned against the two other clerical figures. When it comes to determining the successor of the supreme leader by the committee in the Assembly of Experts, the chairman of the Assembly of Experts wields a great deal of power and could play a major role in the decision. Mr. Rafsanjani played a truly key role in selecting Mr. Khamenei as the leader.

The fundamentalist approach and the realist approach, have fundamentally different attitudes towards the Jurisprudent Guardian [Supreme Leader] and his jurisdictions. The fundamentalist approach towards the Jurisprudent Guardian more or less reserves an immaculateness for the post. In fact, they believe that the leadership should enjoy the authorities and powers previously held by the Shiite Imams, and with such mentality, the issue of supervision would be meaningless, because if someone is immaculate, everything he does would naturally be correct. Contrary to this view, the realists believes that there ought to be certain authorities reserved for the Jurisprudent Guardian, though they nonetheless believe that the supreme leader must be held accountable his policies and his appointments. The reformists believe that it is entirely possible for the Jurisprudent Guardian to make wrong decisions and that it is up to the Assembly of Experts to evaluate the policies and decisions taken by the supreme leader. The fundamentalist vision denies such a possibility.

A clear historical trend in Iran was that the hard-liners had indicated that they did not care what it was that the people might want. They believed that they had God on their side, and they were prepared to do what was necessary in order to continue with their rule. Iran had an evolving constitutional change, which had been to reduce the powers of elected positions, like that of the president of the Majles, and to expand the powers of appointed positions from the Supreme Religious Leader, and to expand the powers of the judiciary. So the space for elections was diminished. Only the hardest liners among the conservatives were prepared to use all-out repression. That reflected a constant dynamic between hard-liners and more moderate camps within the Islamic government that was really moving toward a more representative and democratic system. The hardest-line people were the people who controlled the secret police, the people who controlled the military, and the Revolutionary Guards. They had clearly indicated that they were prepared to use force to kill people in order to stay in power, irrespective of what an election showed.

The Iranian regime has often based much of its legitimacy on its religious credentials and connection with Qom. The Qom howzeh would fear the transfer of prominence to the Al-Najaf howzeh. As suggested by an editorial in "Farhang-i Ashti," Al-Najaf was the "new Islamic Vatican" and it rivaled Qom.

Supreme Defense Council (SDC)

2009-08-08T23:48:00.000-07:00

Iran's strategic planning and the establishment of its military and defense policies have been the responsibilities of the Supreme Defense Council (SDC, and sometimes referred to as the Supreme National Defense Council), created in 1980, which has representatives at operational area and field headquarters to provide political and strategic guidance to field commanders. SDC representatives may also veto military decisions.

According to Article 110 of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the faqih (an expert in Islamic religious jurisprudence; in Iran the Supreme Leader assumes this function) was empowered to appoint and dismiss the chief of the Joint Staff, the commander in chief of the Pasdaran, two advisers to the Supreme Defense Council (SDC), and the commanders in chief of ground, naval, and air forces on the recommendation of the SDC. He was also authorized to supervise the activities of the SDC and to declare war and mobilize the armed forces on the recommendation of the SDC. As faqih, Ayatollah Khomeini, although maintaining the role of final arbiter, delegated the post of commander in chief to the president of the Republic.

Iran's President, in his capacity as the chairman of the SDC, had ultimate responsibility for all Defense Inustries Organization (DIO) operations. The DIO is a state conglomerate of arms and other military related insturies. The SDC also authorized the creation of a seperate grouping of organizations specifically for the Pasdaran in 1983.

In addition to specifying the duties of the commander in chief, Article 110 establishes the composition of the SDC as follows: President of the country, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, Commander in Chief of the Pasdaran, and two advisers appointed by the faqih. Other senior officials may attend SDC meetings to deliberate national defense issues. In the past, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Interior, Minister of the Pasdaran and his deputy, Air Force and Navy Commanders in Chief, War Information Office Director, and others have attended SDC meetings. The Ground Forces Commander in Chief following the 1979 Revolution, Colonel Seyyed-Shirazi, was a member of the SDC as a representative of the military arm for the faqih, whereas Majlis (the Iranian parliament) speaker Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was representative of the political arm for the faqih.

Initially the commander of an operational area was burdened by the presence at his headquarters of an SDC representative and a personal representative of Ayatollah Khomeini. Both of these influential individuals could effectively take any matter over the commander's head to higher authority. In 1987 the SDC representative in the Western Operational Area Command was also the Pasdaran commander for the operational area command, a situation that further complicated the command and control system. Reports in 1987 indicated that SDC orders to regional representatives had been modified to limit the heavy casualty rates caused by their inappropriate advice. Inexperienced non-military religious advisers had seen their interference in purely technical matters dramatically curtailed.

The Urumiyeh reorganization proposals recognized the administrative separation of the services as part of Iran's political reality. Consequently, as of 1987 there were two chains of command below the SDC, one administrative and the other operational. To some extent this dual chain of command existed because the revolutionary government had retained a modified version of the organizational structure of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces (IIAF), which was modeled on the United States division of powers between the administrative functions of the service secretaries and the operational functions of the secretary of defense and chiefs of staff. In addition, the IRP leaders wanted to limit friction between the regular military and the Pasdaran. According to Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the service Commanders in Chief, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of the Pasdaran were removed from the operational chain to avoid further friction between the two groups.

The Supreme Defense Council was replaced with the reorganized and expanded Supreme National Security Council in 1989.

Supreme National Security Council

2009-08-08T23:44:00.000-07:00

Replacing the Supreme Defense Council in 1989, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC, also sometimes referred to as the Supreme National Defense Council, an alternate name for the prior Supreme Defense Council) was an institution founded in the course of the revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The SNSC was established with an aim to watch over the Islamic Revolution and safeguard the IRI's national interests, as well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

According to Article 177 of the Constitution, the responsibilities of the SNSC were as follows:

■1. To determine the national defense/security policies within the framework of general policies laid down by the Supreme Leader.
■2. To coordinate political, intelligence, social, cultural and economic activities in relation to general defense/security policies.
■3. To exploit material and non-material resources of the country for facing internal and external threats.

The SNSC had the lead on Iran's nuclear program. Commensurate with its responsibilities, the SNSC established sub-committees such as defense subcommittee and national security sub-committee. The sub-committees were headed by the President or one of the members of the SNSC appointed by the President.

Limits of the authorities and functions of the sub-committees were laid down by law, and their organizational structure were approved by the SNSC. Approvals of the SNSC were to be enforceable after ratification of the Supreme Leader.

The members of the SNSC consists of:

■Heads of the three Powers (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary)
■Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces (SCCAF)
■The official in charge of the Plan an Budget Organization (PBO; now the Management and Planning Organisation or MPO)
■Two representatives nominated by the Supreme Leader
■Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Information (Intelligence)
■A minister concerned with the subject, and the highest authorities of the Army and the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC)

On 6 July 2005 Hassan Rohani was reported to have resigned his post as Secretary of Iran's SNSC. Rohani had served as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator in the Islamic state's talks with the European Union since October 2003. He had been sharply criticized by the newly elected President, hardline Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Council spokesman Ali Aghamohammadi later said the report was false. "Rowhani will remain in his position until President Mohammad Khatami's term ends. After that it is up to Ahmadinejad, who has not announced any stance on Rowhani," Aghamohammadi said. "Some people are implying that Rowhani does not want to cooperate with Ahmadinejad's administration, but that is completely wrong."

In mid-October 2005, Hussein Entezami succeeded Ali Aqamohammadi as the SNSC's spokesman, and Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli was appointed as the council's secretary and deputy head. Entezami was the founder and managing director of the "Jam-i Jam" newspaper, which was linked with the state broadcasting agency (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, or IRIB), and Rahmani-Fazli was the deputy head of that organization. Then SNSC secretary, Ali Larijani, headed IRIB until he ran in the June 2005 presidential election.

Other council officials were replaced as well. Seyyed Ali Monfared, who had served in the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and the Foreign Ministry, replaced Hussein Musavian as a foreign policy adviser to Larijani. Moreover, the SNSC underwent structural changes after Ahmadinejad's August 2005 inauguration. It was suggested that this involvement could signal an increased involvement of the IRGC in Iran's nuclear activities, already controlling the countries strategic arsenal.

Ali Larijani replaced Hassan Rohani as Secretary of the SNSC, and served in that role, as well as that of Iran's primary nuclear negotiator, until he resigned in October 2007. Saeed Jalili replaced Larijani, and was cited as having strong ties to both Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad. Jalili was given the additional role of Representative of the Supreme Leader in the SNSC in July 2008.

Persian Empire

2009-08-08T23:28:00.000-07:00

The Aryan race is mentioned in Old Persian sources from around 500 BC onwards. The word Iran itself means 'the Land of Aryans.' Indians and Iranians consider themselves Aryan. In 19th century Europe the meaning of the term Aryan was distorted after the discovery of the Indo-European language family. It gave rise to the theory that all white Europeans descended from an ancient people called the Aryans.

Persia first grabbed the attention of the historic world in the sixth century BCE with the exploits and conquests of the near-legendary Cyrus the Great, conqueror of the Medes, and of his successors Darius and Xerxes, so strikingly described in the renowned fifth century BCE classical Greek works of the historians Herodotus and Xenophon. Powerful rulers dominated the Iranian world and influenced the great ancient cultures that surrounded it, until the native dynasties succumbed to the unrelenting push of Islam in the early seventh century CE. Persian culture and society were then fundamentally altered, yet the interplay between the older era and the Islamic era yielded a new, uniquely Iranian amalgamation.

The growth of a new and strong dynasty under the Azerbaijani Safavids (CE 1501-1736), with the backing of Anatolian and Syrian Turkomen in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the importance of Iran to European mercantile interests, especially under the British East India Company, explained the growth of materials about Iran and the countries held within its empire. The foreign relationships that arose in that era with the Ottoman Empire and Russia to the north and the European countries of the west, continued their influence in Iran right into the twenty first century.

Modern Iranian history began with a nationalist uprising against the Shah in 1905 and the establishment of a limited constitutional monarchy in 1906. The discovery of oil in 1908 would later become a key factor in Iranian history and development. In 1921, Reza Khan, an Iranian officer of the Persian Cossack Brigade, seized control of the government. In 1925, having ousted the Qajar dynasty, he made himself Shah and established the Pahlavi dynasty, ruling as Reza Shah for almost 16 years.

Reza Shah forcibly enacted policies of modernization and secularization in Iran, and the central government reasserted its authority over the tribes and provinces. During World War Two the Allies feared the monarch's close relations with Nazi Germany. In September 1941, following the occupation of western Iran by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate. His son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, became Shah and would rule until 1979.

During World War Two, Iran had been a vital link in the Allied supply line for lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union. After the war, Soviet troops stationed in northwestern Iran not only refused to withdraw but backed revolts that established short-lived, pro-Soviet separatist regimes in the northern regions of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. These ended in 1946. The Azerbaijani revolt crumbled after U.S. and United Nations (UN) pressure forced a Soviet withdrawal. Iranian forces also suppressed the Kurdish uprising.

In 1951, the government of nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq (sometimes spelled Mossadegh) nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). In the face of strong public support for Mossadeq, the Shah fled to Rome. In August 1953, the U.S. and U.K. engineered a coup against Mossadeq, during which pro-Shah army forces arrested the Prime Minister. The Shah returned soon thereafter.

In 1961, Iran administered a series of economic, social, and administrative reforms--pushed by the Kennedy administration--that became known as the Shah's White Revolution. The core of this program was land reform. Modernization and economic growth proceeded at an unprecedented rate, fueled by Iran's vast petroleum reserves, the third-largest in the world. However, his autocratic method of rule and pro-western policies alienated large sectors of the population, including the Shia clergy.

In 1978, domestic turmoil turned to revolution as a result of religious and political opposition to the Shah's rule, including abuses committed by SAVAK, the hated internal security and intelligence service. The revolution was comprised of several groups, including nationalists, Islamists, Marxists, and others who came together to oppose the Shah. In January 1979, the Shah left Iran; he died abroad several years after.

On February 1, 1979, exiled religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from France to assume control of the revolution and established himself as Supreme Leader of a new, theocratic republic guided by Islamic principles. Following Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989, the Assembly of Experts chose the outgoing president of the republic, Ali Khamenei, to be his successor as Supreme Leader in what proved to be a smooth transition externally. There was debate amongst senior clerics regarding Khamenei's relative lack of religious credentials.

The 1979 Islamic revolution and the 1980-88 war with Iraq transformed Iran's class structure politically, socially, and economically. During this period, Shia clerics took a more dominant position in politics and nearly all aspects of Iranian life, both urban and rural. After the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979, much of the urban upper class of prominent merchants, industrialists, and professionals, favored by the former monarch, the shah, lost standing and influence to the senior clergy and their supporters. Bazaar merchants, who were allied with the clergy against the Pahlavi shahs, also have gained political and economic power since the revolution. The urban working class has enjoyed somewhat enhanced status and economic mobility, spurred in part by opportunities provided by revolutionary organizations and the government bureaucracy. Though the number of clergy holding senior positions in the parliament and elsewhere in government has declined since the 1979 revolution, Iran has nevertheless witnessed the rise of a post-revolutionary elite among lay people who are strongly committed to the preservation of the Islamic Republic.

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Iran Introduction

2009-08-08T23:25:00.000-07:00

Iran is a constitutional Islamic republic with a theocratic system of government where ultimate political authority is vested in a religious scholar, the Supreme Leader. Shia Islam is the official religion of Iran, and Islamic law is the basis of the authority of the state. The Iranian Constitution guarantees freedom of worship to Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, though they are sometimes the subject of discrimination and repression. The workweek in Iran is Saturday through Thursday; however, many government offices and private companies are closed on Thursdays. Friday is the day of rest when all establishments are closed.

Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution there have been two views within the government of the Islamic Republic. The first view is a radical, conservative, and fundamentalist view which has had a stronger role in directing the government and people of Iran. In foreign policy it sees a conflict in the policies of Iran’s Islamic regime and that of the “aggressive regimes” (as the government calls them) headed by America. The second viewpoint believes in Islam and the Revolution but at the same time it is a moderate viewpoint.

Some elements of the Iranian regime and the population remain hostile to the United States. As a result, American citizens may be subject to harassment or arrest while traveling or residing in Iran. In 2007, Iranian authorities prevented a number of Iranian-American citizen academics, journalists, and others who traveled to Iran for personal reasons from leaving for several months, and in some cases detained and imprisoned them on various charges, including espionage and posing a threat to national security. Iranian authorities may deny dual nationals access to the United States Interests Section in Tehran, because they are considered to be solely Iranian citizens.

Iran is a pluralistic society. Persians are the largest predominant ethnic and cultural group in this country, though many are actually of mixed ancestry. The population of the country has important Turkic elements (e.g., Azeris) and Arabs predominate in the southwest. In addition, Iranian citizens include Kurds, Balochi, Bakhtyari, Lurs, and other smaller minorities, such as Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, and Brahuis (or Brohi). The Iranian regime continues to repress its minority religious and ethnic groups, including Bahai, Arabs, Kurds, Azeris, and others. Consequently, some areas within the country where these minorities reside, including the Baluchistan border area near Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Kurdish northwest of the country, and areas near the Iraqi border, remain unsafe.

Iran's foreign relations are based on sometimes competing objectives. Iran's pragmatic foreign policy goals include, not surprisingly, protecting itself from external threats and building trade ties. Iran also exports its fundamentalist revolution to other countries and supports terrorist organizations, and its vehement anti-U.S. and anti-Israel stances are well-known.

Iran's relations with many of its Arab neighbors have been strained by Iranian attempts to spread its Islamic revolution, a strictly ideological goal. In 1981, Iran supported a plot to overthrow the Bahrain Government. In 1983, Iran expressed support for Shi'ites who bombed Western embassies in Kuwait, and in 1987, Iranian pilgrims rioted during the hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Egypt mistrusts Iran because of support of Egyptian Sunni fundamentalists. Iran backs Hezbollah (in Lebanon), Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, all of which are violently opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Since the toppling of Shah Reza Pavlavi, long-standing international economic sanctions against Iran, combined with the conservative Shia Islam of the ruling religious mullah elite with great antipathy to the West and Israel have produced complex national security requirements for Iran. Striving to re–establish its traditional sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf region as its major player, Iran faces challenges not only from the West, and especially the United States, but also from local powerful and influential potentates.

Iran's primary national security concerns are predominantly “local” relating to maintaining the internal security of the country. This translates to maintaining the security of the Islamic revolution that began with the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Iranian security has three focal points: securing the country against opposition elements like Iraqi sponsored Mujahedin operating along Iran’s border with Iraq; maintaining territorial integrity against long standing potential secessionist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan; and preventing the incursions of religious ethnic insurgents into Iran from Iran’s neighboring states. Such incursions could originate especially from those states in the process of decomposition such as Iraq and Afghanistan or in conflict like Azerbaijan and nearby Tajikistan.

The mission of Iran's Armed forces is to assure the territorial integrity of the country. Subsequent to the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraqi conflict that decimated Iran's military capability, Iran has been in a gradual armament and military infrastructure rebuilding process. Given the political isolation Iran faces and the multitude of its threats from a US presence in the region, a hostile Iraq to the west and uncertain ethnic tensions within the states to its north and east, Iran has embarked on a substantial rearmament program. The immediacy of Iran's concerns for its internal security posed by threats on all its flanks will preoccupy its military to concentrate on diminishing the likelihood that the stability inherent in those regions does not spread to Iran.

Accordingly, Iran has concentrated its military strategies on two primary goals:

■Maintain the internal security of Iran to prevent the rise of nationalistic uprisings among its ethnic-religious minorities. The potential for these uprisings is fueled by conflicts in countries to the north of Iran as well as in Afghanistan to the east.
■Confine the access of the United States to the Persian Gulf. Iran's deployment of anti-ship missiles such as the Chinese Silkworm system at the Strait of Hormuz and the purchase of submarines with mine-laying capabilities support this objective.
The Iranian ground forces remain incapable of modern combined arms combat. This is due to its adherence to outmoded doctrinal concepts, an inappropriate force structure largely relying on straight infantry formations and an inability to effectively integrate air and ground operations throughout Iran's rugged terrain, large size and great operational depth.

Iran’s air and air defense forces are the weakest link in the overall defense posture of the country. This situation will remain so until the modernization of Iran’s aircraft occurs, the numbers of such aircraft increase and the training of its pilots and depth of its repair parts inventory improve. The majority of the inventory of the replacements to its aging U.S. manufactured fighters and fighter-bombers is a mix of Russian and Chinese aircraft. Despite serious problems that are currently being addressed through foreign arms acquisitions and the indigenous development and production of Azarakhsh and Tandar military trainer aircraft, Iran's air force has a modest offensive capability. However, Iran remains vulnerable to attack from the air due to the poor state of its air defenses.

As a result of its vulnerability to air attack due to the significant deficiencies in its strategic air defense system, Iran is building up its strategic missile forces as a cost effective way of countering the stronger air forces of its neighbors and compensating for its weakness in this area. Iran’s strategic weapons development program is its top military priority; by all indications, the portion of the budget devoted to this program remains substantial despite the fact that severe financial pressures have forced major cuts elsewhere. Iran’s effort will continue to be focused on building the infrastructure needed to produce nuclear weapons, the production of biological weapons and the acquisition or production of missiles and strike aircraft to deliver them.

Increases in defense spending in the 1990s stemmed from internal evalutaions of the Pasdaran and regular Iranian armed forces during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988-89. After the conflict the National Security Council and the Iranian High Command called for a number of improvements. Recommendations focused on four areas: modernization and rationalization of the command structures of the republic's armed forces (including the Pasdaran), the creation of a single chain of command, rearmament, and the development of the country's defence industries. The outgoing prime minister (Moussavi) summarized the government's thinking on this in September 1988 when he said, "the fundamental duty was to strengthen the defence forces."

The strengthening was combined with a push toward military self-sufficiency, which saw the Iranians look for foreign technical assistance in developing a variety of capabilities, both operational and in production of equipment. Iran countined its trend of espousing strong independant rhetoric, however, marking even the license production of foreign equipment as great leaps forward for Iranian military industries. Reports of Iranian advances in indigenous capability between 2000 and 2008 were continually debated as being possibly the product of foreign technical assistance from Iran's allies, such as Russia, Ukraine, China and North Korea.

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Iran Climate

2009-08-08T23:15:00.000-07:00

Iran has been described as having a variable climate. In the northwest, winters are traditionally cold with heavy snowfall and subfreezing temperatures during December and January. Spring and fall are relatively mild, while summers are dry and hot. In the south, winters are mild and the summers are very hot, having average daily temperatures in July exceeding 38^o C. On the Khuzestan plain, summer heat is accompanied by high humidity.

In general, Iran has an arid climate, in which most of the relatively scant annual precipitation falls from October through April. In most of the country, yearly precipitation historically averaged 25 centimeters or less. The major exceptions are the higher mountain valleys of the Zagros and the Caspian coastal plain, where precipitation averages at least 50 centimeters annually. In the western part of the Caspian, rainfall often exceeds 100 centimeters annually and is distributed relatively evenly throughout the year. This contrasts with some basins of the Central Plateau that receive ten centimeters or less of precipitation annually.

Iran's post-Revolution moves toward industrial development and its continued expansion of its oil industries were potential factors in future changes to its climate. By 2008 Iran reportedly suffered from air pollution, especially in urban areas, from vehicle emissions, refinery operations, and industrial effluents, deforestation, overgrazing, desertification, oil pollution in the Persian Gulf, wetland losses from drought, soil degradation (salination), inadequate supplies of potable water, water pollution from raw sewage and industrial waste, and other effects of urbanization.

Especially in urban areas, vehicle emissions, refinery operations, and industrial effluents contributed to poor air quality. Between 1985 and 2005, huge increases in energy consumption tripled carbon emissions. Most cars used leaded gas and lacked emissions control equipment. Tehran was rated by 2008 as one of the world's most polluted cities. The abundance of fossil fuels discouraged the use of alternative fuels. Much of Iran's territory suffers from desertification and/or deforestation. Industrial and urban wastewater runoff has contaminated rivers and coastal waters and threatened drinking water supplies. Wetlands and bodies of freshwater were increasingly being destroyed as industry and agriculture expanded, and oil and chemical spills had harmed aquatic life in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Iran contended that the international rush to develop oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea presented that region with a new set of environmental threats. Although a Department of Environment had existed since 1971, Iran had not developed a policy of sustainable development because short-term economic goals, particularly support of the oil and gas industries, had taken precedence.

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Iran Terrain

2009-08-08T23:00:00.000-07:00

Iran is one of the world's most mountainous countries. Its mountains have helped to shape both the political and the economic history of the country for several centuries. The mountains enclose several broad basins, or plateaus, on which major agricultural and urban settlements are located. Until the twentieth century, when major highways and railroads were constructed through the mountains to connect the population centers, these basins tended to be relatively isolated from one another. Typically, one major town dominated each basin, and there were complex economic relationships between the town and the hundreds of villages that surrounded it. In the higher elevations of the mountains rimming the basins, tribally organized groups practiced transhumance, moving with their herds of sheep and goats between traditionally established summer and winter pastures. There are no major river systems in the country, and historically transportation was by means of caravans that followed routes traversing gaps and passes in the mountains. The mountains also impeded easy access to the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea.

Iran is about one-fifth the size of the continental United States, or slightly larger than the combined area of the contiguous states of California, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. As of 2008 Iran was bounded by Afghanistan (936 kilometers), Armenia (35 kilometers), Azerbaijan proper (432 kilometers), Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan enclave (179 kilometers), Iraq (1,458 kilometers), Pakistan (909 kilometers), Turkey (499 kilometers), and Turkmenistan (992 kilometers). Iran's coastline included 2,440 kilometers on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman and 740 kilometers on the Caspian Sea.

Iran consists of rugged, mountainous rims surrounding high interior basins. The main mountain chain is the Zagros Mountains, a series of parallel ridges interspersed with plains that bisect the country from northwest to southeast. Many peaks in the Zagros exceed 3,000 meters above sea level, and in the south-central region of the country there are at least five peaks that are over 4,000 meters. As the Zagros continue into southeastern Iran, the average elevation of the peaks declines dramatically to under 1,500 meters. Rimming the Caspian Sea littoral is another chain of mountains, the narrow but high Alborz Mountains. Volcanic Mount Damavand (5,600 meters), located in the center of the Alborz, is not only the country's highest peak, but also the highest mountain on the Eurasian landmass west of the Hindu Kush.

The center of Iran consists of several closed basins that collectively are referred to as the Central Plateau. The average elevation of this plateau is about 900 meters, but several of the mountains that tower over the plateau exceed 3,000 meters. The eastern part of the plateau is covered by two salt deserts, the Dasht-e Kavir and the Dasht-e Lut. Except for some scattered oases, these deserts are uninhabited.

Iran has only two expanses of lowlands: the Khuzestan plain in the southwest and the Caspian Sea coastal plain in the north. The former is a roughly triangular-shaped extension of the Mesopotamia plain and averages about 160 kilometers in width. It extends for about 120 kilometers inland, barely rising a few meters above sea level, then meets abruptly with the first foothills of the Zagros. Much of the Khuzestan plain is covered with marshes. The Caspian plain is both longer and narrower. It extends for some 640 kilometers along the Caspian shore, but its widest point is less than 50 kilometers, while at some places less than 2 kilometers separate the shore from the Alborz foothills. The Persian Gulf coast south of Khuzestan and the Gulf of Oman coast have no real plains because the Zagros in these areas come right down to the shore.

There are no major rivers in the country. Of the small rivers and streams, the only one that is navigable is the Karun, which shallow-draft boats can negotiate from Khorramshahr to Ahvaz, a distance of about 180 kilometers. It is 830 kilometers in total length. Other rivers include the Safid Rud (1,000 kilometers), Kharkeh (700 kilometers), and Zayandeh Rud (400 kilometers). Several other permanent rivers and streams also drain into the Persian Gulf, while a number of small rivers that originate in the northwestern Zagros or Alborz drain into the Caspian Sea. On the Central Plateau, numerous rivers, most of which have dry beds for the greater part of the year, form from snow melting in the mountains during the spring and flow through permanent channels, draining eventually into salt lakes that also tend to dry up during the summer months. There is a permanent salt lake, Lake Urmia (the traditional name, also cited as Lake Urmiyeh, to which it has reverted after being called Lake Rezaiyeh under Mohammad Reza Shah), in the northwest, whose brine content is too high to support fish or most other forms of aquatic life. There are also several connected salt lakes along the Iran-Afghanistan border in the province of Baluchestan va Sistan.

Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) dispute sovereignty over three islands in the Persian Gulf that were occupied by Iran as of 2008 and had been occupied since before the 1979 Revolution. Iran also had claims that its territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles and its contiguous zone, 24 nautical miles. The exclusive economic zone claimed by Iran was determined by bilateral treaties or median lines in the Persian Gulf. The maritime border with Iraq along the Shatt al Arab waterway was established by treaty in 1975 as the median line of the deep-water channel, but the final status of the treaty awaited the conclusion of a peace treaty to replace the 1988 cease-fire agreement between Iran and Iraq. In opposition to at least two of the other four littoral states, Iran advocated a division of the bed of the Caspian Sea that would give Iran control of an area about 20 percent greater than the area it would control under a division based on the actual length of each littoral state's coastline. The debate remained as of 2008 over whether the Caspian Sea was technically a sea or lake, which had implications on the drawing of borders, the requirements on bordering states before engaging in construction projects (such as underwater pipelines), and the distribution of resource rights.